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I. INTRODUCTION
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are popular investment
products that have recently generated substantial investment press,
several new regulations, huge earnings for the securities markets, and
potential legal conflicts that will likely lead to major litigation. ETFs
are derivative securities that represent ownership in funds, unit
investment trusts, or depositary receipts with portfolios of securities
designed to track the performance and dividends of specific securities
indices.' ETFs track indices by holding a representative sampling of
securities in the index, thus approximating investment results of the
index as a whole. 2 They may or may not hold all the stocks in a
1. There will inevitably be discrepancies between the performance of the index and the
ETF. See, e.g., Prospectus: Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) A-3 (Jan. 26, 2000)
[hereinafter Spiders Prospectus] ("[T]he market price of each individual SPDR may not be
identical to the net asset value of such SPDR."), http://www.nasdaq.com/reference/prospectus
_spy.pdf. The funds are designed, however, to track indices with a low level of error, perhaps
less than five percent. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,299, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,907, 51,914
n.25 (Aug. 9, 2002) ("As with its Equity ETFs, Barclays represents that the [fixed income] Funds
will have a tracking error relative to the performance of their respective underlying indices of no
more than 5%.").
2. See Spiders Prospectus, supra note 1, at A-2 ('The SPDR Trust holds all of the common
stocks of the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500 Index) and is
intended to provide investment results that, before expenses, generally correspond to the price
and yield performance of the S&P 500 Index."); Vanguard Total Stock Market VIPERs, 5 (May
24, 2001) [hereinafter VIPERs Prospectus] ("Some index funds hold each stock found in their
target indexes [sic] in about the same proportion as represented in the indexes [sic] themselves.
This is called a 'replication' method.... [T]he Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund uses a
'sampling' technique.") http://www.nasdaq.com/reference/prospectus-vipers.pdf; Prospectus:
Nasdaq-100 Trust, Series 1, Nasdaq-100 Index Tracking Stock, A-1, (Jan. 31, 2003), [hereinafter
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particular index in weighted proportion. 3 Exchange traded funds,
while conceptually similar to mutual funds, trade more like common
stock because their net asset value is determined throughout the day. 4
A mutual fund's net asset value is determined at the end of the
trading day after the fund manager has made his trades.5 Exchange
traded funds, however, trade rapidly in response to changes in the
value of fund components and "changes in prices of options and
futures contracts on the funds. '6 A large enough bloc of ETF shares,
called a "creation unit," may be exchanged for stock in the companies
forming the tracking portfolio. 7 Exchange traded funds are popular
with investors because they offer a diversified, low-cost, tax-efficient
method of investing.8
There are several players in the ETF market: the index
provider, the ETF creator and issuer, the securities markets, and the
QQQ Prospectus] ("The Trust holds all of the common stocks of the Nasdaq-100 Index (the
"Index") and is intended to provide investment results that, before expenses, generally
correspond to the price and yield performance of the Index."), http://www.nasdaq.com/reference
prospectus-qqq.pdf; see also, SEC Notices, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,916, 51,917 (Aug. 9, 2002) (describing
how the iShares Russell Funds track the securities in the underlying index through a "passive"
or indexing approach); Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,298, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,614, 51,614-15 (Aug.
8, 2002) (stating that iShares tracks the Morgan Stanley Capital International Japan Index
through "portfolio sampling").
3. See, e.g., Spiders Prospectus, supra note 1, at A-3 (stating that the securities are
adjusted "to conform to periodic changes in the identity and/or relative weightings of the S&P
500 Index Stocks"); VIPERs Prospectus, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that the Fund's advisers
choose a "representative sample of stocks ... that resembles the index in terms of industry
weightings").
4. Exchange Traded Fund-ETF, at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/etf.asp (last
visited Feb. 21, 2004).
5. See id.
6. Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,246, 67 Fed. Reg. 1527, 1528 (Jan. 11, 2002).
7. See, e.g., Spiders Prospectus, supra note 1 at A-2 ("SPDRs can be redeemed only by
tendering to the Trust 50,000 SPDRs .. "); Prospectus: Diamonds Trust, Series 1 at A-2 (Feb.
23, 2000) [hereinafter Diamonds Prospectus], http://www.nasdaq.comlreference/prospectus
_dia.pdf; QQQ Prospectus, supra note 2 at A-i; see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,306, 67
Fed. Reg. 51,916, 51,918 n.14 (Aug. 9, 2002) ("The Commission notes that unlike typical open-
end investment companies, where investors have the right to redeem their fund shares on a daily
basis, investors in ETFs can redeem them in creation unit size aggregations only."); Exchange
Act Release No. 34-43,926, 66 Fed. Reg. 9731, 9732 (Feb. 9, 2001) (noting in connection with the
Boston Stock Exchange that an ETF based on the S&P Global 100 "can only be redeemed in
Creation Units of 50,000 Fund Shares, principally in-kind for a specified portfolio of stocks held
by the Fund then comprising the Deposit Securities"); Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,299, 67
Fed. Reg. 51,907, 51,909 (Aug. 9, 2002) (noting in connection with the NYSE that iShares will be
issued in groups of 50,000 or more called Creation Unit Aggregations and only Creation Unit
Aggregations may be redeemed).
8. "These products are a dream-for financial service marketers and for... investors
alike .... They are low-cost, tax efficient, provide ample diversification among groupings of large
businesses, and they are among the least time consuming of all investing strategies." Bill Mann,
The Age of the Exchange Traded Fund, MOTLEY FOOL, FOOL.COM, at http://www.fool.com/news
/fothI2000/fothOO072 1.htm.
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individual investors. Each stands to profit tremendously from the
popularity of these products. The free-market structure designed by
Congress, however, makes it nearly impossible for index providers to
maintain financial interests in ETFs based on their indices. This Note
examines the difficulties that arise when index providers nonetheless
attempt to maintain a financial interest in ETFs based on their
indices by charging licensing fees to secondary exchanges that sell
ETFs. Consideration of these problems leads to a surprising
conclusion: the index providers' practice of imposing licensing fees on
secondary exchanges for ETFs is without support in market regulation
law, trademark law, or economic policy. Without a clear basis for
imposing the licensing fees, the fees are an unjustified burden
ultimately borne by the investing public. The current practice should
not be tolerated by exchanges that presently pay such fees.
Part II of this Note examines the history of exchange traded
funds, the concept of unlisted trading privileges, and their
interrelation in the current competitive landscape of the ETF market.
The legislative history of the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994
(UTP Act) shows that Congress intended to eliminate procedural
formalities and encourage inter-market competition for efficiency.9
The latter purpose is apparent in the current environment, as inter-
market competition for ETFs can be seen driving efficiency. Part III
argues that the current practice of imposing licensing fees on
secondary exchanges is contrary to the congressional policies
embodied in the UTP Act. Part IV contends that a trademark-based,
intellectual property argument for licensing fees, while intuitively
appealing, does not withstand scrutiny because (1) index providers do
not have a protectable interest in their marks as used in ETFs on
secondary exchanges and (2) even if index providers could establish a
protectable interest, secondary exchanges can defend on the ground
that they are making a fair use of the index providers' marks. Part V
examines possible economic justifications for the imposition of
licensing fees on secondary exchanges. For example, the negative
effects of market fragmentation might suggest that index providers
should employ licensing fees to control the circumstances of ETF
trading. Professors Amihud and Mendelson argue that securities
issuers, having a clear incentive to increase the liquidity of their
claims, should be the sole determiners of where and how those claims
are traded.10 Part V then responds to the application of Amihud and
Mendelson's argument, concluding that such application cannot justify
9. H.R. REP. No. 103-626 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299.
10. See infra section V.B.
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licensing fees. Ultimately, secondary-exchange licensing fees are not
supportable under current law. Furthermore, there is no reason to
change the law to accommodate such licensing fees because the
economic policy arguments are ultimately not compelling. Absent
these justifications, the burden such licensing fees place on the market
and the investing public should not be tolerated.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Exchange Traded Funds
In the early 1990s, Nathan Most, a product development
specialist at the American Stock Exchange (Amex), wanted to create
an investment fund that traded like a stock but was also a depositary
receipt for the shares in the fund.11  Although the Investment
Company Act of 1940 did not contemplate such a creature, the first
ETF, Spiders, was carefully designed and issued in 1993.12 Exchange
traded funds are issued by a fund that invests in a portfolio of
securities designed to provide investment results that attempt to track
the total return of the underlying security index.13 Since 1993, the
market for ETFs has grown to more than 120 products with total
assets valued near $80 billion. 14 The vast majority of ETFs are listed
on the Amex, 15 and some, like Spiders, were even created by that
11. Bruce Kelly, Spider- Woman Sees Funds Take Hold on Wall Street; Active Management
Next Thread, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Aug. 6, 2001, at 13; Bruce Kelly, ETFs: Bliss for This Spider-
Woman, INVESTMENT NEWS, July 30, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Kelly, ETFs].
12. Kelly, ETFs, supra note 11. For example, because the ETF is essentially a hybrid
between a stock and a mutual fund, the Amex legal team had to determine whether the ETF
would be treated like a mutual fund or a stock. Id. at 2. Investors receive a prospectus when
they buy shares in a mutual fund, but the minute to minute trading of ETFs might have
rendered such a requirement cost prohibitive. Id. Regulators had to be convinced that adequate
disclosure could be made to investors without requiring a full prospectus whenever shares in an
ETF were purchased. See id.
13. To be clear, this fund is the creator and issuer of the shares in the ETFs, not the index
provider. For example, Diamonds are issued by the DIAMONDS Trust, but the prospectus
disclaims: "The Trust, based on the DJIA, is not sponsored, endorsed, sold, or promoted by Dow
Jones .. " Diamonds Prospectus, supra note 7, at A-i; see also Spiders Prospectus, supra note 1,
at A-1 (' The Trust... is not sponsored by or affiliated with Standard & Poor's or the McGraw
Hill-Companies, Inc."); ETF Advisors Trust, Exchange Act Release No. IC-25,725, 67 Fed. Reg.
57,464, 57,464 (Sept. 10, 2002) (describing an investment company's SEC application for certain
exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940 to create a fixed-income ETF based on
various Ryan Treasury indices).
14. Kelly, ETFs, supra note 11.
15. For example, in May 2002, the Amex listed 117 of 119 ETFs. Andrew Brent,
Competition for ETF Market Heats Up: NYSE, AMEX Waive Fees to Attract Listings, MUTUAL
FUND MARKET NEWS, May 6, 2002 (quoting Bob Rendine, senior vice president at the Amex).
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exchange.1 6 Among the most popular ETFs are Spiders, based on the
Standard & Poor's 500 index; Diamonds, based on the Dow Jones
Industrial Average; and Vanguard's VIPERS, tracking the Wilshire
5000 Total Market Index.17 The QQQ, which tracks the Nasdaq-100
index,18 is the most liquid security in the United States.1 9 It was
created by Nasdaq and then licensed to the Amex until June 2005,
when it was expected to return to Nasdaq after that market had
become a national exchange. 20 The competition in the burgeoning
ETF market is fierce. To fully understand the current competitive
environment, however, it is necessary to first examine the concept of
unlisted trading privileges.
B. Unlisted Trading Privileges
1. Introduction
The general rule is that an exchange may not trade a security
unless it is listed on that exchange. 21 The Securities Exchange Act,
however, provides for a concept known as unlisted trading privileges
(UTP).22 Simply put, any security listed on one registered national
exchange (or the Nasdaq) can be traded on any other exchange
16. Spiders Prospectus, supra note 1, at Front Cover (identifying SPDR sponsor PDR
Services LLC as "Solely Owned by American Stock Exchange LLC").
17. Id.; Diamonds Prospectus, supra note 7, at Front Cover; VIPERs Prospectus, supra note
2, at 2.
18. QQQ Prospectus, supra note 2, at Front Cover. The Nasdaq-100 Index is composed of
the one-hundred largest nonfinancial companies on the Nasdaq, divided into the following nine
Industry Groups, in descending order of weight: computer and office equipment, computer
software/services, telecommunications, retail/wholesale trade, biotechnology, health care,
services, manufacturing, and transportation. Nasdaq-100, Nasdaq-100 Index Tracking Stock,
http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/indexshares.asp?symbol=QQQ (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). The top
ten holdings of the QQQ are, in descending order of weight: Microsoft Corp., Intel Corp., Cisco
Systems Inc., Qualcomm Inc., Nextel Communications, Inc., Amgen Inc., Dell Inc., Comcast
Corp., eBay Inc., and Oracle Corp. Id.
19. SEC Notices, 67 Fed. Reg. 9489, 9490 (Mar. 1, 2002) (proposing to increase the fees for
its index information, because, in part, the ETFs "based on the NASDAQ 100 Index is the United
States' most heavily traded ETF, averaging over 60 million daily share volume").
20. QQQ Prospectus, supra note 2, at Front Cover (identifying sponsor Nasdaq Financial
Products Services, Inc. as "owned by The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc."); Isabelle Clary, Island Sets
ECN Record for QQQs Volume, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Mar. 25, 2002. The term "ECN" is an
acronym for electronic communications network. ECNs function as securities markets. See infra
notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (2000).
22. § 781(f).
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pursuant to unlisted trading privileges. 23  The UTP mechanism
frustrates what would otherwise be a very profitable strategy for the
national exchanges, i.e., to be the only place where a certain popular
security could be traded. This strategy will hereinafter be referred to
as "substantive competition." The alternative to substantive
competition is "efficiency competition," which occurs when multiple
exchanges offer the same product and must consequently compete for
order flow by offering it at a better overall price. Using this
terminology, unlisted trading privileges frustrate substantive
competition and force exchanges into efficiency competition with each
other. If a security is popular enough, other exchanges will exercise
their unlisted trading privileges to offer it despite not having the
benefit of listing fees.24 The resultant competition will not be for
another unique product, but for order flow in the shared product.
Orders will flow to the exchange that can provide a more efficient and
liquid market for the particular security. 25 Competition has in fact led
to more efficient markets. As Brandon Becker, Director of the SEC's
Market Regulation Division, observed, "[t]he introduction of new
technologies that benefit investors has been the result of competition
between and among markets and market participants. '" 26 Inter-
23. § 781(f)(1). The text simply provides that "[n]otwithstanding the preceding subsections
of this section, any national securities exchange, in accordance with the requirements of this
subsection and the rules hereunder, may extend unlisted trading privileges to (i) any security
that is listed and registered on a national securities exchange, subject to subparagraph (B); and
(ii) any security that is otherwise registered pursuant to this section, or that would be required
to be so registered except for the exemption from registration provided in subparagraph (B) or
(G) of subsection (g)(2) of this section, subject to subparagraph (E) of this paragraph." Id. The
exchange that has the listing agreement with the issuer is the "primary exchange." The
exchange that trades a security pursuant to unlisted trading privileges is the "secondary
exchange."
24. See infra notes 66-73 where the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) did precisely this,
determining that the QQQ was too popular and potentially lucrative not to offer it.
25. To offer a concrete example, if Security A is listed on the NYSE, it can be traded on the
National Stock Exchange (NSE), Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX), Pacific Stock Exchange (PCX),
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (Phlx), or Boston Stock Exchange (BSE) pursuant to the UTP.
Because Security A can be purchased in any of a number of different markets, there will be inter-
market competition over providing a better trading experience, faster execution, tighter spreads,
lower transaction fees, etc. If Security B is available only on the NYSE, there is no competition
that will force the NYSE to become more efficient in these areas vis-A-vis Security B.
26. See Financial Markets and Trading Privileges: Hearing on H.R. 4535 Regarding the
Market 2000 Report and the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (June 22, 1994)
[hereinafter Becker Congressional Testimony] (testimony by Brandon Becker, Director, Division
of Market Regulation, SEC), available at 1994 WL 14189229; see also Financial Markets and
Trading Privileges: Hearing on H.R. 4535 Regarding the Market 2000 Report and the Unlisted
Trading Privileges Act of 1994 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (June 22, 1994) [hereinafter Ketchum Congressional
Testimony] (testimony of Richard Ketchum, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating
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market competition is perhaps the best way to create an investor-
friendly marketplace.27
2. Legislative History of the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994
Congress specifically addressed unlisted trading privileges
with the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994.28 The legislative
history of that act describes the role Congress envisioned unlisted
trading privileges would play in the market. Prior to 1936, exchanges
were free to trade any security whether it was listed or unlisted with
very little oversight or regulation. 29 The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was amended in 1936 to eliminate this practice, except as
provided in section 12(f).30 As originally envisioned in 1936, the
national exchanges would have to apply to the Securities and
Exchange Commission for permission to exercise their unlisted
trading privileges for each security. 31 There was also a statutory
minimum of ten days for notice and opportunity for hearing while the
SEC examined each application. 32 Under the system envisioned, a
national exchange generally had to wait between forty-five and sixty
days to extend UTP to every single security. 33 The effect was to
provide the listing exchange with a monopoly over the trading of that
security while the other exchanges waited for SEC approval of their
UTP application. 34 When the secondary exchanges finally entered the
market for a particular security, the listing exchange had a
competitive advantage due to the initial, yet temporary, monopoly. As
Richard Ketchum of NASD, Inc. testified before Congress: "It is during
these first few weeks (within the forty-five to sixty day application
period) that expectations are set about the competitiveness of the
Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.) (agreeing with Becker testimony),
available at 1994 WL 14189248.
27.
"The [National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")] strongly believes that the
best markets for investors result from vigorous, fair competition. [The NASD]
support[s] a presumption of free and open competition among all markets, unless a
strong reason can be found to rebut that presumption .... [The UTP Act] promotes
competition in the marketplace by allowing the regional stock exchanges to compete
for order flow with the listing exchange and the third market .. "
Ketchum Congressional Testimony, supra note 26; see also infra section V.A.
28. Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)).
29. H.R. REP. No. 103-626, at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299, 3300.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3300-01.
32. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3301.
33. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3302.
34. Id. (describing this as the "principal effect" of the old UTP application procedure).
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various markets for that security's trading, and will thus influence
where orders for that security will be traded in the future."35 The SEC
application procedure unquestionably had substantive effects on inter-
market competition.
The application procedure outlined in the 1936 amendments to
the Securities Exchange Act quickly became a mere formality,
however. No UTP application was disapproved by the SEC after
1939.36 The Commission processed hundreds of UTP applications each
year, approving every one of more than 1,600 filed in 1993. 37 Virtually
no comments were submitted by interested parties from 1983 to
1993.38 While some issuers continued to assert an interest in where
their securities were traded, the SEC had only to find that the
extension of UTP would be "consistent with the maintenance of fair
and orderly markets and the protection of investors" in order to force
an issuer to accept unwanted UTP of its securities. 39 In Ludlow Corp.
v. SEC, for example, Ludlow argued that it would be injured by the
Boston Stock Exchange's (BSE) unlisted trading of Ludlow shares.40
Ludlow argued that unlisted trading on the BSE might destabilize
trading in Ludlow stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
where it was listed, thereby impairing Ludlow's ability to raise equity
capital in the future.41 Despite finding an injury-in-fact to Ludlow, the
D.C. Circuit held that the SEC met the requirements of the statute
and allowed the grant of UTP to the BSE.42 Such deference by
reviewing courts to the SEC was typical in cases where securities
issuers objected to the extension of UTP to their securities. 43 The end
35. Ketchum Congressional Testimony, supra note 26.
36. H.R. REP. No. 103-626 at 3, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3301.
37. Id. For every application, "the Commission... is forced to process each UTP
application individually, ensure that notice of the application has been published in the Federal
Register for a minimum of 10 business days, evaluate the application, and issue an approval
order." Id.
38. "Comments on exchange UTP applications are rare, and the Commission annually
issues hundreds of orders granting exchange UTP applications on a routine basis." Id. at 13,
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N at 3311 (letter from Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman). Brandon Becker,
the Director of the Division of Market Regulation at the SEC informed the Committee that
"[UTP application review] is a time-consuming, paper-intensive process where we have not
identified any commentary that we have received that would justify the amount of resources we
commit to it." Id. at 3, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3301 n.5.
39. Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, 604 F.2d 704, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78l(f)(2)
(1976)).
40. Id. at 706.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 711.
43. See, e.g., id.; see also Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003, 1008
(7th Cir. 1989) ("To the extent there is a common law right to a stable and informed market for
shares of stock, and we doubt there is such an animal, that right belongs to shareholders, not to
2004] 1133
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result was that application to the SEC for extension of unlisted
trading privileges became a mere formality that only delayed a
nonlisting exchange's ability to extend UTP to already-listed
securities.
To eliminate this procedural formality, Congress passed the
Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994. 44 The Act was intended to
increase efficiency competition among the markets by eliminating the
procedural formality of exchange application to the SEC. 45 According
to the Act's House Report, "[n]ew Section 12(f)... enhances the
opportunity for competition among exchanges by removing regulatory
delays caused by requirements for exchange application, notice, and
approval that currently exist under Section 12(f) of the Exchange
Act."46  The immediate practical effects of the UTP Act were
elimination of procedural formalities and a subsequent increase in
inter-market competition. Such competition was intended to lead to
an increase in market efficiency, as demonstrated by tighter spreads,
faster execution, lower transaction costs, and more liquid markets. 47
The SEC, perhaps taking its cue from Congress, has
demonstrated its commitment to the idea that fostering inter-market
competition is to the advantage of investors. Although Congress'
belief that the delay necessitated by SEC approval was too long
prompted passage of the UTP Act of 1994, it was possible that a brief
initial period of consolidated trading would be beneficial. 48 The issue
arose in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs), which were often
extraordinarily volatile because of heavy trading at the very beginning
of an IPO. 49 Concerned by the perceived volatility of IPOs, Congress
an issuer"); Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting issuer's claims of misappropriation, violation of trademark laws and unfair
competition).
44. Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 781(f) (2000)).
45. Congress, in 1994, had some evidence that "the delays caused by the UTP application
and approval process may have anticompetitive impacts." H.R. REP. No. 103-626, at 4 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299, 3302. Therefore, the Committee believed that the UTP Act
would "benefit investors by further enhancing competition." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3303.
46. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3300. Even before the UTP Act, the D.C.
Circuit noted the congressional goal of inter-market competition, writing that "[u]nlisted
trading... is an indispensable part of Congress' plan that securities markets compete with one
another" and "Congress found unlisted trading to be an essential element of the national
securities market system." Ludlow Corp., 604 F.2d at 709-10.
47. The goal of the UTP Act was to "serve to further the underlying objectives of the
Exchange Act with respect to free, open and competitive markets for all existing securities."
H.R. REP. No. 103-626, at 6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3304. For a definition of bid-ask
spreads, see infra note 175.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 103-626, at 4-6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3302-04.
49. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3304.
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granted a two-day monopoly over IPOs to the listing exchange, subject
to subsequent SEC rulemaking. 50 After a period for study and notice
and comment rulemaking, the SEC decided to eliminate that delay. 51
The SEC received seven letters commenting on the proposal to
eliminate the waiting period, all of which were in favor of the
proposal. 52  An exchange may now exercise its unlisted trading
privileges after a single trade is reported to the Consolidated Tape.53
Despite some worries about possible price volatility and consequent
widening of spreads in the heavy volume often characteristic of the
early days of an initial public offering, 54 the SEC action creates inter-
market competition almost immediately for a security making an
IPO. 55
The purpose of the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994 was
to increase efficiency competition among markets by eliminating any
lingering possibility of substantive competition through delay in UTP
extension. 56 After the first trade is reported to the Consolidated Tape,
the security may be traded on any exchange. 57 This immediate
50. 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(1)(B)-(C) (2000).
51. Unlisted Trading Privileges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43217, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,560,
53,560 (Sept. 5, 2000) ("[A] national securities exchange will be permitted to begin trading an
IPO issue immediately after the first trade in the security is reported by the listing exchange to
the Consolidated Tape.").
52. Id. at 53,562. One letter, from Schwab, directly addressed the issue of inter-market
competition: "Schwab also commented in support of the amendment. Schwab argued that the
current delay is an impediment to free and open competition in the listed markets, noting that it
insulates the primary market from competition and precludes valuable price discovery." Id.
53. Id. at 53,560. The Consolidated Tape is "[a] high-speed system that continuously
provides the last sale price and volume of any securities transaction in listed stocks to the
public." New York Stock Exchange, Consolidated Tape, at http://www.nyse.com/glossary/glossary
.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). The following exchanges participate in the Consolidated Tape:
the American Stock Exchange (Amex), the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE), the National Stock Exchange (NSE), the Chicago Stock Exchange
(CHX), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE), and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX). Id.
54. A 1998 study the CHX, NSE, and PSE cited acknowledged the concerns, but found that
"there is no empirical basis for the contention that multiple exchange trading on the first day of
an IPO adversely affects market quality, either by increasing price volatility or widening bid-ask
spreads. In fact, the evidence indicated that listed IPOs that are not traded on more than one
exchange can be more volatile than dually or multiply listed IPOs." Unlisted Trading Privileges,
65 Fed. Reg. at 53,561.
55. This result is precisely what the SEC action intended. Id. at 53,562-63 ("Removing the
one-day trade delay will enhance competition among linked markets, consistent with.., the
Exchange Act.").
56. See H.R. REP. No. 103-626, at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299, 3300.
57. This action currently is subject to the restraints licensing fees impose, which cause
exchanges to change their fee schedule, necessitating notice and comment rule making. See infra
notes 116-123 and related discussion.
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competition was designed to improve market quality and efficiency.58
A 1998 study cited by the CHX, NSE, and PCX found that
the price volatility of IPOs and spin-offs traded on only one exchange was approximately
30% higher than that of the IPOs and spin-offs that were traded on at least two
exchanges. In addition, in its comparison of bid-ask spreads, the study showed that
there was no statistically significant difference between the two groups.
5 9
The empirical evidence suggests that even one or two days of
consolidated trading of IPOs fails to improve market quality, and may
actually harm investors. 60
Investors do not stand to benefit as much from consolidated
trading of securities because, when only one exchange sells a security,
there is no external competitive pressure to increase efficiency.6'
Under current regulations, no exchange can have a unique and
profitable trading opportunity because UTP allow the same securities
to be traded in multiple markets after a single trade on the listing
exchange. Any profitable security will be extended UTP by at least
one secondary exchange, which will then compete for order flow with
the primary, listing exchange. The only way left for markets and
exchanges to compete with each other is on an efficiency level. 62
Exchanges try to attract order flow in shared products by having lower
transaction fees, tighter spreads, faster executions, and high quality
58. Unlisted Trading Privileges, 65 Fed. Reg. at 53,562.
59. Id. at 53,561.
60. The SEC found that "the current one-day trading delay provides no real benefits and
actually inhibits competition among markets" and that "enhanced competition in an IPO should
benefit investors by providing increased opportunities for order execution." Id. at 53,562-63.
61. NYSE and Nasdaq fought to get Bank of New York (BoNY) to list its potentially highly
lucrative ETFs on their respective exchanges. "Nasdaq has offered millions of dollars to BoNY in
marketing services as an incentive to snag their product .... " Jessica Sommar, ETF War Heats
Up: Nasdaq, NYSE Fight for New BONY Funds, N.Y. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at 47. Suppose that
NYSE gets BoNY to exclusively trade its ETFs on the Big Board. Without unlisted trading
privileges, there would be no external pressure on the NYSE to offer lower transaction fees or
tighter spreads for BoNY products because the NYSE would have a monopoly on the trading of
those ETFs. One could argue that BoNY itself would put pressure on NYSE to become more
efficient because that would increase liquidity and BoNY's ETFs' value. BoNYs pressure,
however, likely would be considerably less than the pressure Nasdaq or the Amex would exert in
competing for order flow. See also infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
62. Schwab made this point in comments regarding the proposed elimination of the waiting
period when it "noted that the delay will hamper ECNs that choose to register as exchanges, and
provides an unfair advantage to ECNs that are not regulated as exchanges." Unlisted Trading
Privileges, 65 Fed. Reg. at 53,562. Electronic communication networks such as Island generally
have an efficiency advantage over the national exchanges. See infra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text. Unless ECNs become registered exchanges, they operate "outside" the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such external pressure for efficiency from ECNs, Schwab
argues, is too much to overcome for national exchanges that are burdened by SEC regulations.
Unlisted Trading Privileges, 65 Fed. Reg. at 53,562 n.23. The important point is that the
competition is on an efficiency level, and does not contemplate substantive competition for
exclusive trading opportunities.
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market makers or specialists. The competition in the ETF market,
encouraged by unlisted trading privileges, drives efficiency to the
benefit of investors.
C. Competition and Efficiency in the Exchange Traded Fund Market
The cutthroat competition between markets over ETFs
underscores the desirability of a substantial share in the ETF market.
It also plainly shows the financial importance of ETFs to the securities
markets and index providers. The availability of this important
revenue source motivates securities markets to jockey for position in
the ETF trade. A brief description of the current competitive
landscape follows to demonstrate inter-market competition driving
market efficiency.
The Amex originally developed the ETF in 1993 and has since
then been the listing exchange for the vast majority of ETFs. 63 The
Amex is primarily a derivatives market, 64 and it is thought to need
ETF revenues to compete with the NYSE. 65 In perhaps the most
highly visible sign of inter-market competition over ETFs, the NYSE,
for the first time in its history, exercised its unlisted trading privileges
over some of the most popular ETFs that were then listed and traded
on the Amex.66 The Amex had previously faced competition in the
ETF market from the regional exchanges and other markets, but the
Big Board never threatened the Amex's hegemony. 67  As Kevin
McNally, an ETF analyst and vice president at Salomon Smith Barney
63. See supra note 15. The world's first ETFs, however, were traded on the Toronto Stock
Exchange as early as 1990. Gordon Platt, Exchange Traded Funds Growth Continues, Even in a
Down Market, GLOBAL FIN., Nov. 2002, at 46, 46. Because this Note is restricted to American
trading systems, the Amex may be properly considered the birthplace and home of most ETFs for
present purposes.
64. Amex lists 117 of 119 domestic ETFs, while NYSE has only one ETF paying a listing
fee. Brent, supra note 15. The QQQ has become one of the most important securities on the
Amex, accounting for more than one-third of the Amex's ETF trading volume on an average day.
Bruce Kelly, Amex, Big Board Wage Price War Over ETFs: Amex Halting Fees to Blunt NYSE
Move, INVESTMENT NEWS, July 23, 2001, at 1.
65. The Amex depends on ETFs for about 30 percent of its bottom line. Gregory Bresiger,
War of Exchanges Over ETFs, TRADERS MAG., Aug. 1, 2001. "Amex needs to focus on ETFs and
derivatives rather than its shrinking equities business." Consolidation Process Will Likely
Continue in Securities Industry, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, July 15, 2002, at 2 (interviewing Steve
McLaughlin, founder and managing partner of Financial Technology Partners).
66. Zach Kouwe, Brokers Raise Concerns Over ETF's in Bear Hunter Meeting, WALL ST.
LETTER, July 9, 2001, at 1, 7; Sommar, supra note 61 ("For the first time in the 200-year history
of the venerable institution, the NYSE this year resorted to offering a product it does not list, the
most popular ETF known as the QQQ.").
67. See generally Kelly, supra note 64 (discussing the NYSE's move to suspend fees on ETF
trading).
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described the unprecedented move by the NYSE: "If it were the Boston
Stock Exchange coming in to UTP [ETFs], it wouldn't make a big
difference. But the New York Stock Exchange? That's a big
difference." 68
In early 2002, the NYSE further exercised UTP over twenty-
seven more Amex ETFs. 69 In addition to exercising its unlisted
trading privileges, the NYSE became more aggressive in the ETF
market by going head to head with the Amex for ETF trading
volume.70 The competition continued when, in the summer of 2002,
the NYSE exercised its UTP yet again, this time to cover a series of
seven fixed-income ETFs listed on the Amex. 71 The Amex responded,
announcing a plan in August 2002 to exercise UTP over 120 Nasdaq-
listed stocks.7 2 This move created the opportunity to trade the QQQ
(which is based on the Nasdaq-100 Index), all 100 stocks in that index,
and twenty other Nasdaq stocks in the S&P 500 all at the same
national market 73
Another clear example of the battle between the Amex and
NYSE over ETFs is the elimination of transaction charges. The NYSE
eliminated transaction charges for ETFs in an effort to lure more of
the lucrative business to its trading floor.74 The Amex followed suit to
prevent order flow from being diverted to the now more efficient
NYSE. 75 The NYSE even convinced two of its ETF specialists to waive
68. Id. at 1.
69. NYSE To Trade 27 Additional AMEX-Listed ETFs, WALL ST. LETTER, Feb. 18, 2002, at
2 ("[T]he New York Stock Exchange will phase in unlisted trading privileges for 17 Merrill Lynch
HOLDRs, nine sector SPDRs and the Standard & Poor's Mid-Cap 400 throughout the year.").
The NYSE only lists one ETF, the iShares S&P Global 100, which is not one of the largest ETFs.
Dow Jones Newswires, NYSE Adds 27 Funds to Exchange Trading, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002,
at C21.
70. 'The New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange are going to war
over exchange traded funds." Bresiger, supra note 65.
71. Another ETF Blow by Big Board, TRADERS MAG., Aug. 1, 2002 ("The NYSE's plan is a
damaging but not fatal blow to the Amex, which has pioneered an array of ETFs but watched
helplessly as volume was picked up by other players."), 2002 WL 11694864.. The Amex
responded to this latest UTP by suspending transaction charges indefinitely on the NYSE-listed
iShares. AMEX Puts ETF Transaction Charges on Hold, WALL ST. LETTER, Aug. 5, 2002, at 9.
72. Isabelle Clary, Amex Rolling Out Nasdaq Stocks Auction-Style, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS,
Aug. 12, 2002, at 15.
73. Id.
74. The NYSE proposed to eliminate transaction fees on UTP ETFs on August 6, 2001.
Exchange Release Act No. 34-44,622, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,079 (July 30, 2001). 'The New York Stock
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange have engaged in a pricing battle over ETFs, trying
to lure asset managers to their respective floors. As the NYSE has eliminated transaction fees
on ETFs, Amex has done the same all in an attempt to become the leading exchange for ETFs."
Brent, supra note 15.
75. The Amex explained that it eliminated transaction fees "to maintain a competitive, level
playing field. We're not going to allow [the NYSE] to gain any sort of competitive advantage." Id.
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their commissions entirely for a temporary period. 76 Unlike the Amex,
however, the NYSE does not have additional revenue from ETF listing
fees due to the unlisted status most ETFs enjoy on the NYSE.77 The
waiving of fees therefore represents a strong commitment by the
NYSE to become a major player in the ETF arena.
Another indicator of the competition is the concern at the
NYSE over the Amex's competing market maker system.78 NYSE
floor brokers worried that they could not compete for order flow with
the Amex's competing market makers. 79 Competing market makers
theoretically add liquidity to a security by allowing the market makers
to trade for their own accounts alongside the specialists for the
security.80 The Amex's professional dealers could trade larger orders
than ordinary investors, giving the Amex the larger and more liquid
market and preventing ETF order flow from following the unlisted
trading privileges to the NYSE.81 The floor brokers' concern, whether
well-founded or not, reinforces the notion that the two exchanges were
engaged in a real battle over ETFs.
Faced with the aforementioned concerns, the NYSE proposed a
specific rule change in an effort to stay competitive with the Amex.8 2
The NYSE therefore proposed to amend its front end systemic capture
(FESC) rule to compete with other exchanges that do not have FESC
76. Kouwe, supra note 66, at 7. Bear Hunter Structured Products Trading and Spear,
Leeds & Kellogg Specialists waived their commissions for three months for ETF orders executed
within five minutes. Id.
77. The competitive lowering of costs caused potentially large revenue losses. The
transaction fees on both the NYSE and Amex immediately prior to the fee suspension were as
follows: 63 cents per 100 shares for specialists, 73 cents per 100 shares for registered traders,
and 60 cents per 100 shares for off-floor broker/dealers. Brent, supra note 15. In the first
quarter of 2002, the Amex traded an average of almost 32.5 million shares daily. Id. This
translates to revenue loss between $195,000 per day and $237,250 per day. See id. (providing
prior Amex transaction fee rates and trading volume). The NYSE is without some additional
profits available to the Amex. Due to the unlisted status of 31 ETFs on the NYSE, the exchange
also misses out on $155,000 in initial listing fees and $62,000 annually thereafter. Id. (providing
prior NYSE listing fee rates).
78. Kouwe, supra note 66, at 1.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7. For example, on the Nasdaq, market makers hold a certain number of shares
to facilitate trading. Investopedia, Market Maker, at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/
marketmaker.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). Market makers buy securities from sellers and
sell to buyers, accepting the risk of holding stocks in the interim. Id. They quite literally make
the market for a security by "matching" buyers and sellers. Specialists perform a substantially
similar market creation and maintenance function, and the terms are interchangeable for
present purposes.
81. Kouwe, supra note 66, at 7.
82. Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,246, 67 Fed. Reg. 1527 (Jan. 11, 2002).
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requirements.8 3  The lack of a FESC rule permitted the other
exchanges to execute faster trades than was possible on the NYSE,
resulting in their having more liquid markets.8 4
The battles are not limited to providing a more efficient and
more liquid trading environment. When Bank of New York (BoNY)
proposed to create its own ETFs, the NYSE and Nasdaq engaged in a
bidding war to entice BoNY to list with their respective markets.8 5
Nasdaq offered millions of dollars in marketing services to sweeten
the deal for Bank of New York.8 6 Such enticements are trivial when
compared to the potential upside of gaining a strong toehold in the
ETF market, which may have a market potential at least as large as
the $1 trillion invested in mutual funds.8 7
The national stock exchanges face stiff competition not only
from each other, but also from the over-the-counter market and from
electronic communications networks (ECN) such as Island. Electronic
communications networks provide securities markets (not registered
national exchanges) that offer lightning-fast trade execution and can
steal some of the volume from the national exchanges.88 On March 19,
2002, Island ECN set a record for an electronic communications
network when it captured 45 percent of the market share volume in
the QQQ.89 Although there are complaints that Island is not "playing
fair,"90 such competition may nonetheless drive market efficiency
exactly as Congress envisioned. If Island ECN is not ordered to "slow
83. The NYSE's FESC rule requires that all orders in any security be entered into an
electronic database before they are represented to the auction market. Exchange Act Release
No. 34-43,689, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,145, 79,145 (Dec. 18, 2000). The NYSE proposed to enter orders
within ninety seconds after the representation to the auction market in order to speed up the
trades and compete with other ETF markets. 67 Fed. Reg. at 1528.
84. 67 Fed. Reg. at 1528.
85. Sommar, supra note 61.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Amex officials).
88. "[A]lthough Amex often has better prices than Island on the QQQs, it is difficult to
access Amex's best prices, while Island offers lighting-fast speed of execution and cancellation."
Isabelle Clary, Fast-Growing Island Closer to Exchange Filing, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Dec. 10,
2001, at 1, 33.
89. Clary, supra note 20. Island also captured 24 percent of Spiders, 24 percent of
Diamonds and 32 percent of Merrill Lynch's HOLDRs, on that date. Id. By comparison, the
Amex accounted for 36 percent of Spiders and 27 percent of Diamonds. Id.
90. 'The SEC's Regulation ATS of 1998 'requires alternative trading systems that trade 5
percent or more of the volume in national market system securities to ... disseminate the best-
priced orders in those national market system securities displayed in their systems, including
institutional orders, into the public quote stream.' " Clary, supra note 88, at 33. Island, whose
QQQ share regularly exceeds five percent, is not complying with this regulation, prompting
complaints from the Amex. Id.
[Vol. 57:3:11251140
BUCKING THE TREND
down," the Amex's only option to stay competitive will be to speed up
its own trading; in other words, to become more efficient.
There are two important lessons in this overview of the
competition among markets for the ETF trade. The first is that inter-
market competition can, and does, increase efficiency. The
competition is forcing the markets to become more efficient as no
market allows another to gain an advantage. This can be seen most
clearly in the elimination of transaction charges by NYSE and the
Amex. 91 It can also be seen in the success that Island ECN has had in
increasing its volume in the QQQ by offering an efficient, electronic
method for trading.92 The second lesson is that all the players in the
highly lucrative ETF business have strong incentives to maintain a
financial stake in these products. All markets, specialists, dealers,
and investors have strong incentives to bring the highest volume of
orders to their markets. Likewise, index providers wish to maintain
some financial stake in the ETFs once they begin trading on the
exchanges because of the high volume of the most popular ETFs. The
next section examines the conflicts that arise when index providers
attempt to exercise control over properly created ETFs in the market.
III. CHARGING LICENSING FEES FOR ETFs CONTRADICTS
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN ENCOURAGING UNLISTED TRADING
There is an inherent tension between competitive free market
principles and allowing index providers to continue to profit from
properly created ETFs. The index providers can only continue to
profit from the use of their indices in ETFs if they can exercise control
over the ETF in the market. However, allowing self-interested private
actors to limit availability of products in the market runs counter to
the basic understanding that open competition is the best incentive for
exchanges to become more efficient. Allowing index providers to
control ETFs in the market, or a particular market's access to certain
ETFs, seems contrary to the best interests of investors, which are
served by wide availability and low transaction costs. Index providers
who attempt to control or limit the exchanges that may trade certain
ETFs are undermining the congressional purpose and intent of
unlisted trading privileges.
91. See supra notes 74-77 and related discussion.
92. See supra notes 88-90 and related discussion.
2004] 1141
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A. The Current Practice of Charging Licensing Fees for ETFs
Index providers primarily attempt to control ETFs based on
their indices by charging a licensing fee to markets that desire to offer
those ETFs. The common practice is to require licensing agreements
before an ETF can be traded, even traded on a secondary exchange
pursuant to unlisted trading privileges. 93 For example, the Boston
Stock Exchange pays a licensing fee to Dow Jones to trade Diamonds
pursuant to unlisted trading privileges. 94 The Amex also had a
licensing agreement with Dow Jones granting the Amex the rights to
use the Dow Jones trademarks in connection with the trading of
Diamonds.95 The Amex licensing agreement with Dow Jones left open
some question as to whether Dow Jones could deny the National Stock
Exchange (NSE) the ability to trade Diamonds. 96 The Amex also pays
licensing fees for several other ETF products, and passes those fees
through to its specialist units.97 As another example, the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange (Phlx) pays a licensing fee to Nasdaq for the UTP
trading of the QQQ. 98
Further examples are abundant. The primary terms of the
Phlx licensing agreement with Nasdaq appear to be a disclaimer of
liability to protect Nasdaq, and a license that permits the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange to use the name "Nasdaq-100 Index Tracking
Stock."99 The Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) proposed to change its
fee schedule to allow for the assessment of marketing fees on ETFs to
which it had extended unlisted trading privileges. 100 Indeed, the CHX
wrote that "the marketing fee would be assessed only against ETF
93. For example, in proposing to pass through licensing fees to third parties, the Amex
wrote that "the Nasdaq Stock Market imposes a license fee on other exchanges that trade the
QQQ pursuant to unlisted trading privileges, and such fee is being, or can be, passed on to the
specialist on at least one regional exchange." Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,972, 67 Fed. Reg.
37,884, 37,885 (May 30, 2002).
94. Boston Exchange Starts Trading Diamonds, WALL ST. LETTER, Mar. 26, 2001, at 2.
95. In re Application of the American Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42,312
(Jan. 4, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-42312.htm..
96. Id. Dow Jones originally told the National Stock Exchange that the NSE was not
permitted to trade in Diamonds because of an exclusive license agreement between Dow Jones
and the Amex. Id. Later, Dow Jones told the NSE that it was "studying the pros and cons of
extending the licensing of Diamonds to additional exchanges." Id.
97. Exchange Act Release No. 34.45,727, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,962, 18,962 (Apr. 17, 2002).
Interestingly, the Amex proposed to pass through any licensing fee whether it is associated with
a listed security, or one traded pursuant to unlisted trading privileges. Id.
98. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,717, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,976, 80,979 (Dec. 22, 2000).
99. Id. "Nasdaq-100 Index Tracking Stock" is the proper name of the ETF, whose ticker
symbol is QQQ. QQQ Prospectus, supra note 2, at Front Cover.
100. Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,282, 67 Fed. Reg. 3517, 3518 (Jan. 24, 2002).
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products, which almost always have an associated licensing fee."101
The Nasdaq imposes a licensing fee on exchanges that trade the QQQ
pursuant to unlisted trading privileges. 10 2 Licensing fees thus appear
to be the common practice among index providers, and exchanges
apparently either pay the fee unquestioningly, or pass the fee through
to the specialist who is allocated that ETF.
The licensing fees charged by index providers can be
substantial, especially for the more popular ETFs. For example, when
the Amex proposed to pass through any licensing fees for the QQQ to
the specialist unit allocated that security, Susquehanna Investment
Group (Susquehanna), the Amex specialist for the QQQ, submitted a
letter in objection. 10 3 Susquehanna stated that the licensing fee would
be approximately five million dollars annually for the QQQ alone.10 4
Susquehanna argued that even if the fee were not imposed on the
specialist alone, but allocated between the specialist and the crowd,
the licensing fee would 'make no economic sense' under current
competitive market conditions."'1 5 Susquehanna further contended
that "a licensing fee imposed on Susquehanna would be discriminatory
and anti-competitive.' 01 6 Susquehanna claimed that the increased
costs for specialists would impede the specialists' ability to offer
competitive spreads. 10 7 Although the Amex's proposed pass-through
became effective despite Susquehanna's objections, 08 the very fact
that the objections were made demonstrates the non-trivial nature of
the licensing fees. The imposition of licensing fees has the potential to
become a substantial burden on the market for ETFs, especially if, as
Susquehanna suggested, it impedes the market makers' or specialists'
ability to offer competitive spreads.
B. The Index Providers'Argument for the Imposition of Licensing Fees
At first glance, index providers seem to have a proprietary
interest in their indices, which would be sufficient to support licensing
101. Id. at 3518 n.6 (emphasis added).
102. Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,972, 77 SEC Docket 2017 (May 21, 2002) (stating the
Nasdaq policy as understood by the Amex), 2002 WL 1042146, *3.
103. Id. at *2-3.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. (citing Susquehanna letter of Mar. 1, 2002).
106. Id. at *3 (discussing letter of May 2, 2002 from Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering on behalf of
Susquehanna).
107. Id. The Amex answered this objection by noting that specialists are merely required to
make fair and orderly markets under prevailing market conditions, and that a licensing fee is
irrelevant to this requirement. Id.
108. Id. at *4 (rule change effective May 16, 2002).
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fees for derivatives thereon. The index providers have invested
substantial resources creating, maintaining and marketing the index.
For example, Nasdaq proposed to increase its fees in part because
ETFs were deriving their value from the Nasdaq indices. 10 9 According
to Nasdaq, "[s]upporting derivative products has required Nasdaq to
increase the resources that it devotes to data quality, timeliness, and
redundancy for the underlying indexes [sic]."110 Beyond the mere
construction of an index, Nasdaq has to invest considerable resources
in "establishing relationships with issuers of [ETFs], and monitoring
their use of Nasdaq Index Information to ensure that it is used
properly." '111 The index provider has a strong interest in controlling
who has access to the index and how it is used.
If an exchange is permitted to trade an ETF without the index
provider's permission, the exchange is free-riding on the index's good
name and mark. Apart from the free-rider reaping where he has not
sown, a "bad" use of index information may potentially damage the
index provider, 'at least in the minds of the investing public, even
though there was no connection between the ETF and the index
provider. Nasdaq noted that market data vendors who simply
redistribute Nasdaq Index Information create risk for Nasdaq.11 2 If
mere redistribution is considered risky, use of the index as the basis
for an investment product would likely be more so.
Consider this hypothetical example. The Law Review Stock
Exchange (LRE) is a struggling securities exchange that depends
almost entirely on unlisted trading to stay afloat. The LRE extends
its unlisted trading privileges to Diamonds and the QQQ, hoping that
the reputation of the two underlying indices will be sufficient to draw
ETF order flow to the LRE and relieve some of the LRE's economic
distress. The LRE will advertise and market that these two popular
products are available on the Law Review Exchange. The LRE is not
only permitted to market the products as having the stability of the
DJIA and Nasdaq behind them, but is required to disclose such
information in either a prospectus or product information sheet.1 13
The index providers will argue that the LRE has exploited their
109. Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,472, 67 Fed. Reg. 9489, 9489-90 (Mar. 1, 2002)
(proposing a 400 percent increase in the fee, from $500 per month to $2000 per month).
110. Id. at 9490.
111. Id. at 9491.
112. Id. This risk may be substantial, as Nasdaq is concerned with potential legal
"exposure" due to the fact that "more investors have more money tied to the calculation of
Nasdaq indexes [sic]." Id.
113. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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reputations in the financial arena without compensation. 14 The index
providers no longer have the opportunity to write to the SEC and
object to a proposed extension of UTP because the formalities of notice
and comment rulemaking were eliminated in 1994.115 An index
provider might plausibly suffer some harm, if only through a loss of
incentive to create indices, if exchanges are permitted to capitalize on
the indices' good names without compensation. Notwithstanding the
potential harm to index providers, licensing fees contradict the two
congressional policies underlying the UTP Act of 1994: elimination of
procedural formalities and enhancement of inter-market competition.
C. Contradiction with Congressional Intent and Policies
Licensing fees reintroduce precisely the same procedural
formalities that the UTP Act of 1994 sought to eliminate. Suppose a
national exchange is required by a particular index provider to pay a
licensing fee for the "permission" to trade ETFs pursuant to unlisted
trading privileges. The exchange would rationally pass the licensing
fee on, probably having the market maker or specialist allocated each
ETF pay the licensing fee for that ETF. The specialist will attempt to
pass the fee on as well, perhaps by offering wider spreads to
investors. 116 The licensing fee will be passed on until it reaches the
investor, because no actor in the chain will pay the licensing fee
without recouping that cost somewhere. Most exchanges appear to
employ this strategy and pass the fees on to specialists. 17 However,
114. Dow Jones made this argument in a misappropriation suit against the Chicago Board of
Trade, which wanted to create a futures contract based on the DJIA. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Dow
Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 85, 88 (Ill. 1983) ("Defendant [Dow Jones] argues that plaintiff seeks
to exploit defendant's reputation for accuracy and impartiality without compensating it for its
good will."). Apart from the basic unfairness of the misappropriation argument, very real
negative consequences might ensue from unlicensed trading of securities. As previously noted,
Ludlow argued that unapproved trading of its shares on the BSE might destabilize the market
for Ludlow shares, thereby impairing Ludlow's ability to raise capital. See supra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text; see also Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003, 1007
(7th Cir. 1989) (alleging that non-disclosures by defendants interfered with an informed market
for its shares which "interfered with Champion's ability to raise equity capital and find
investment bankers willing to manage the placement of its shares"). These arguments did not
prevail in either case. Id.; Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, 604 F.2d 704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
115. Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 781(o (2000)).
116. Susquehanna, the Amex specialist for the QQQ, suggested that if it were required to
pay a licensing fee, it could not offer competitive spreads, meaning that investors would end up
paying the fee. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,727, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,962, 18,962 (Apr. 17,
2002) (proposing a pass through of licensing fees to specialists, Amex allocated an ETF whose
index provider charges a licensing fee).
2004] 1145
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to pass new licensing fees on to specialists, the exchange will usually
have to change its fee schedule. 118 To change the fee schedule, the
exchange will have to go through precisely the same notice and
comment rulemaking formalities that Congress sought to eliminate in
1994, and the SEC completely eliminated when it reduced the two-day
waiting period after an IPO to just one trade.11 9 Therefore, there is a
de facto, if not regulatory, application procedure before an exchange
can extend UTP to an ETF that carries a licensing fee.
Under 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-5 changes to fee schedules are
immediately effective, despite having to go through notice
formalities. 120  Immediate effectiveness seems to render the
contradiction with congressional policy an inconsequential detail.
However, the main purpose of the UTP Act was to eliminate
procedural formalities and inconsequential details.12' The temporary
monopoly argument may fall prey to an immediate rule change. 22
The fact remains that Congress, with the UTP Act, created a
presumption in favor of the secondary exchanges. Rather than a
presumption against UTP, requiring specific approval before each
extension, there is now a presumption in favor of UTP. The only way
to stop UTP is for the SEC to make a specific rule denying unlisted
trading privileges. 123 Licensing fees impose a de facto requirement of
obtaining a specific rule change from the SEC, thereby shifting the
presumption back to its pre-1994 state where specific approval of a
rule was required before extending unlisted trading privileges.
The congressional policy of encouraging inter-market
competition is also potentially threatened by licensing fees. The de
facto procedural formality that presently exists with licensing fees
may not actually hinder competition because of the immediate
effectiveness of fee schedule changes. However, as the Amex's
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f)(2) (2003).
119. Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §781(f)); Unlisted Trading
Privleges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,217, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,560 (Sept. 5, 2000).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-5 (2003).
121. H.R. REP. No. 103-626, at 2-7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N 3299, 3300-05.
122. But see supra notes 103-108, where Amex's fee change was not an immediate change or
inconsequential detail because Susquehanna's objections to the pass-through necessitated at
least a response from Amex and the SEC. It is possible for fee pass-throughs to result in
temporary monopolies if the specialists strenuously object to the proposed fee change. In that
case, the exchange might not extend UTP until it could recoup the licensing fee, giving the listing
exchange a temporary monopoly on the ETF trading. Recognizing this possibility, the present
argument assumes the more likely scenario: such objections would not be successful and would
be avoidable with only cursory action.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 781(0(2)-(3) (specifying the circumstances under which the SEC may
suspend unlisted trading privileges).
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dealings with Susquehanna showed, immediate effectiveness is not
necessarily a smooth process. 124
More problematic, the same rationale used to support licensing
fees would also justify anticompetitive exclusive trading agreements.
The contradiction at an efficiency competition level is currently only
theoretical because index providers do not seem to be limiting the
exchanges that trade ETFs. 125 Any exchange that pays the licensing
fee can trade most ETFs. But, if an index provider may impose a
licensing fee, it can likewise wholly exclude any or all exchanges from
trading that ETF. This may be done through outright exclusion, or by
fixing the licensing fee such that only the most successful exchanges
could afford it. Permitting an index provider to favor one exchange
over all others reintroduces substantive competition at the expense of
the efficiency competition created by the UTP Act of 1994.126 While
the current practice is merely a drag on efficiency, the very same
rationale would permit exclusive trading agreements, which are
decidedly anticompetitive.
Despite a seemingly promising argument in favor of the
current practice of licensing fees, imposition of such fees runs counter
to congressional intent on two fronts. First, licensing fees reintroduce
procedural formalities by creating a de facto rule change requirement
so that the fee may be passed on. Second, the very same rationale
that would support licensing fees in their current form would also
support exclusive licensing and trading agreements-a situation
plainly contrary to Congress' policy of inter-market competition. The
following section examines more closely the index providers' potential
legal arguments in support of licensing fees, ultimately concluding
that such arguments are unpersuasive entirely apart from the conflict
with the congressional policy of the UTP Act.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ETF LICENSING
FEES ARE UNSATISFACTORY
An index provider might assert that the unlicensed use of its
mark by secondary exchanges advertising ETFs violates its trademark
protected property rights. The claim against exchanges exercising
UTP for ETFs is that the exchange gains the benefit of the index
provider's reputation, good name, and resources invested in the index
without compensating the index provider. While a trademark-based
124. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
125. But see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text, which raised some question as to
whether Dow Jones would permit the National Stock Exchange to extend UTP to Diamonds.
126. Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)).
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argument might at first seem an attractive justification for the index
providers requiring licensing agreements, it ultimately cannot
withstand scrutiny.1 27 Specifically, index providers do not have a
protectable interest in properly created ETFs that would allow them
to limit trading opportunities. Moreover, secondary exchanges have a
defense to infringement because they are making a fair use of the
index providers' marks.
A. Index Providers Do Not Have a Legally Protectable Interest that
Would Permit Them to Control Properly Created ETFs
First, the trademark argument assumes that index providers
actually do have a protectable interest in the index as it is used in an
ETF on a secondary exchange. 128 However, index providers cannot
127. State law claims, sounding in either property or tort, are likewise unavailing as the
UTP Act of 1994 would preempt any state law permitting imposition of licensing fees on
secondary exchanges. 108 Stat. 4081. When a state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," the state law
must yield. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1914)). Any state law that could serve as a basis for licensing fees
would be contrary to the policies of the UTP Act of 1994. See supra Part III.C. The common law
tort of misappropriation may be a promising claim for index providers against secondary
exchanges who do not pay licensing fees. Index providers, however, have no proprietary interest
in the ETFs that could be misappropriated. See Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828
F.2d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the misappropriation claim failed because Golden
Nugget had no property interest in the common stock held by its shareholders); infra Part IV.A.
A claim of unfair competition or unfair trade practices likely will fail, as index providers
generally do not compete with secondary exchanges or the ETF issuers. See Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245-46 (1918) (affirming an injunction against a competitor who
had misappropriated plaintiffs news stories). Any in-depth examination of state law claims
would be state specific and thus beyond the scope of this Note. For present purposes, the general
remarks above suffice to demonstrate that it is likely that any state law claim would fail.
128. Standard & Poor's, Dow Jones, and the Nasdaq require a licensing agreement before an
investment group creates an ETF that tracks their respective indices. See Spiders Prospectus,
supra note 1, at B-64; Diamonds Prospectus, supra note 7, at B-49; QQQ Prospectus, supra note
2, at B-50. Intuitively, it is reasonable that the index provider's permission should be required
before that index is used to create a product that is profitable for everyone except the index
provider. If an ETF based on a given index were created without the permission of the index
provider, the creator of the ETF would reap the benefits of the index's diversity and solid track
record, without investing any research, labor, or expertise. This intuition is consistent with
recent legal reasoning. It is clear from McGraw-Hill Co. v. Vanguard Index Trust that an ETF
may not be created without the express permission of the index provider. 139 F. Supp. 2d 544,
556 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the existing licensing agreement between S&P and Vanguard
did not permit Vanguard to create VIPERs, an ETF based on the S&P 500 Index, (not the same
VIPERs referenced supra, note 2) without S&P's further permission); see also Standard & Poor's
Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1063, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting preliminary
injunction to S&P to stop Comex's unlicensed use of the S&P 500 Index to create new futures
contracts on the basis that Comex had misappropriated the index and the "skills, expenditures,
labor and reputation of S&P"), aff'd, 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982). This Note does not examine the
creation or listing of exchange traded funds. Interestingly, the economic policy justification
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determine or limit the exchanges which may trade an ETF based on
that index. 129  The Ninth Circuit compared trading derivative
securities to a transaction for a used car, an analogy that also applies
to index providers and ETFs.130 Two persons engaged in a transaction
for a used car are not infringing on a manufacturer's mark when they
talk about the product as a "BMW' or "Chevrolet." 131 They are just
accurately describing the object of the private transaction. In Golden
Nugget, the Amex accurately described the relevant products as
options contracts on Golden Nugget stock. 13 2  That use did not
constitute an infringement on Golden Nugget's mark.1 33 Indeed, the
court specifically held that Golden Nugget did not have a protectable
interest in the markets where its shares are traded because it had
retained no "proprietary rights in the shares of its stock that would
allow it to control the manner or means of resale of its shares."1 34
Imposing a licensing fee on a secondary exchange is nothing more
than an attempt to "control the manner or means of resale" of shares
in a certain ETF.1 35 Just as Golden Nugget retained no proprietary
interest in the shares after their initial issuance and the car
discussion, see infra Part V, applies to listing exchanges. However, there might be a legal
justification for licensing fees imposed on the listing exchange or the issuing fund. Both these
issues are beyond the purview of this Note. Rather, this Note examines the imposition of
licensing agreements on secondary exchanges that merely extend their unlisted trading
privileges to an ETF already created and listed on another exchange.
129. See Golden Nugget, 828 F.2d at 590 (holding that a corporation does not have a
protectable interest in limiting the exchanges which may trade in its stock or in put and call
option contracts based upon its stock); see also Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878
F.2d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the corporation has no protectable interesting the
market for its shares).
130. Golden Nugget, 828 F.2d at 591 ("We see no distinction between shares of stock and
second-hand cars in this regard.").
131. Id. ("Surely a dealer in a product can describe it accurately by its tradename....
Describing the product nondeceptively and by name brand has never been a violation of a
manufacturer's trademark."); see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d
350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that automobile repair shop could advertise that it repaired
"Volkswagens" or "VWs" without infringing on trademark); WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n,
926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that television station could use trademarked phrase
"Boston Marathon" to describe the event). The Ninth Circuit described these cases "as involving
a non-trademark use of a mark-a use to which the infringement laws simply do not apply." New
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992).
132. Golden Nugget, 828 F.2d at 587.
133. Id. at 591.
134. Id. at 590. Logically, if Golden Nugget did not have a protectable interest in the market
where its own shares were traded, it would not have a protectable interest in the market where
derivatives of its shares were traded. Index providers are yet another step logically removed-
there is no "market" at all for an index. Instead it is a collection of information designed to be a
market barometer. Index providers, therefore, do not have a protectable interest in the market
for the derivatives on their indices.
135. Id.
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manufacturer retains no proprietary interest in the car after initial
sale, neither does an index provider have a proprietary interest in an
ETF after it has been properly created and issued. 13 6
The Seventh Circuit held similarly in Champion Parts, Inc. v.
Oppenheimer & Co. 13 7 Champion alleged that Oppenheimer had
interfered with "an informed and stable market for shares" of
Champion stock because Oppenheimer failed to disclose certain
information such as the greater than 5 percent ownership and
intention to take over the company. 138 The Seventh Circuit responded
that "[n]o case has been cited to us, and our independent research has
failed to disclose any case, which holds that an issuer has a property
interest in the market for its shares of stock. Indeed the case law is
uniform that Champion has no [such] interest ... .,139 The court later
tempered its language by clarifying that
Champion correctly observes that it has some interest in the market for its shares since
it may choose to raise capital through a future issue of shares.... [Hiowever that
interest is too speculative to give Champion any protectible [sic] interest in the market
for its shares. To the extent that there is a common law right to a stable and informed
market for shares of stock, and we doubt there is such an animal, that right belongs to
shareholders, not to an issuer.
14 0
By analogy, index providers have no protectable interest that
would allow them to determine which exchanges may trade ETFs
based on their indices. An index provider does not even have the
interest that Champion or Golden Nugget would in the market for
their respective shares because an index provider's stock is unrelated
136. One may argue that car manufacturers and index providers are different because there
is an ongoing relationship with the index provider that does not exist with the car manufacturer.
For cars, there is no ongoing relationship between manufacturers and any consumer (warranties
and product liability notwithstanding). But for ETFs, the very identity of the product at any
given point in time depends fundamentally on the index provider. There are two responses to
this argument. First, an ongoing relationship with the car manufacturer exists, because
consumers purchase the manufacturer's good will, not just the physical good. Second, an ongoing
relationship does not exist between investors and the index provider. Rather, investors share an
ongoing relationship with the issuing fund. The index provider makes a single agreement with
the Fund the same way a car manufacturer makes and sells a single car to a retailer. The Fund
has a licensing agreement with the index provider because there is a protectable interest at the
time the ETF is created. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In contrast, the investors
who trade ETFs after issuance have no relationship whatsoever to the index provider.
137. Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that an issuer's "interest in the market for its shares ... is too speculative to give
Champion a protectible [sic] interest").
138. Id. at 1005, 1007. Investors at Oppenheimer used techniques such as side-by-side
buying and stock parking to avoid arousing suspicions that they were attempting to obtain a
controlling interest in Champion Parts and then liquidate the firm. Id. at 1005.




to the ETF it is asserting the right to control. 141
Thus, Golden Nugget and Champion Parts both suggest that index
providers do not have a protectable interest such that they could limit
the markets permitted to trade the ETFs based on their indices.
142
When an index provider imposes a licensing fee on a secondary
exchange, it asserts an interest that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
have held is not legally protectable. 143 By charging licensing fees,
index providers assert the right to determine which exchanges may
and which may not trade a properly created ETF based on that index.
It is important to remember that the index provider will have a valid
licensing agreement with the fund that creates and issues the ETF. 144
However, by charging licensing fees, index providers are reaching
beyond creation and issuance to markets where the ETF shares are
resold like so many used cars in the Golden Nugget analogy. Upon
examination, the trademark argument that seemed a promising
justification for licensing fees does not withstand scrutiny.
B. Secondary Exchanges May Take Advantage of the Fair Use Defense
Suppose that the index providers could establish a protectable
interest that would permit them to control which markets could trade
ETFs based on their indices. The fair use defense to infringement
would still be available to secondary exchanges extending UTP to an
ETF that carries a licensing fee.' 45 The Lanham Act provides that it is
a defense to infringement if
141. Index providers may contend that competition from ETFs trading in the same market
may interfere with a future issue of their shares. While Nasdaq and Vanguard are not publicly
traded companies, Dow Jones and McGraw-Hill, S&P's parent company, are publicly traded.
Diamonds and Spiders may therefore trade in the same market as Dow Jones and McGraw-Hill
stock. However, Diamonds are not related to Dow Jones stock, but instead to a Dow Jones
product. The value of Dow Jones stock most likely would be unaffected by "competition" with
Diamonds. The point remains that if a company does not have a sufficient interest to control the
market for its own shares, surely it cannot control the market for ETFs merely based on one of
that company's products.
142. This conclusion does not suggest that index providers never have a protectable interest
in their indices. Once the index is licensed to an ETF-issuing fund, however, there is no
continuing protectable interest such that index providers could prohibit trading of the properly
created ETF on any exchange. If an index provider wishes to prevent the use of its index in
connection with ETFs, it can deny a license to the issuing fund in the first place. Once that
license has been issued, however, the index has no continuing protectable interest in the ETF
that would permit it to impose a licensing fee before unlisted trading on a secondary exchange.
143. Champion Parts, 878 F.2d at 1007-08; Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828
F.2d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1987).
144. See supra note 128.
145. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Trade-Mark Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
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the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise
than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual
name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or
their geographic origin. 
1 4 6
Plainly reading the text, secondary exchanges would not be
liable for infringement because they are merely using the index
providers' marks to the extent that they are descriptive of the ETFs
available on that exchange. Exchange traded funds are like cars in
the sense that the trademark must be used to accurately describe the
product; there is no way to inform investors about ETFs without
mentioning by name the index upon which the ETF is based.' 47
The case law indicates that the fair use defense should indeed
protect secondary exchanges from index providers' claims of
infringement when they extend UTP to an ETF. The last disjunct of
the fair use defense applies when the alleged infringer describes a
product that he himself does not produce. 148 Secondary exchanges
extending unlisted trading privileges have no proprietary interest in
the ETF or the index. The product being described is not their own,
but the index provider's, by way of a licensing agreement with the
ETF creator. 149 Where the trademark describes the mark holder's
product, not the alleged infringer's, a three part analysis has been
applied.150
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without the
use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder. 
15 1
146. Id.
147. Judge Kozinski made a similar point in New Kids on the Block v. News America
Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is no more reasonably possible, however,
to refer to the New Kids as an entity than it is to refer to the Chicago Bulls, Volkswagens, or the
Boston Marathon without using the trademark.").
148. § 1115(b)(4). When the act requires that the fair use "describe the goods or services of
such party," the reference is to the allegedly infringed-upon party. Id. (emphasis added). The
statutory language may not directly apply to the present situation because the ETF issuing fund
is an intermediary between the allegedly infringing secondary exchanges and the allegedly
infringed-upon index providers. The product described is not "of' the index provider but is "of'
the issuing fund. This point is mentioned only in passing, and this Note will assume that the
index provider has a stronger connection with the secondary exchange than may actually exist.
149. The ETF "belongs to" the index provider only insofar as the index provider has a
licensing agreement with the creator of the Fund allowing the ETF to track the provider's index.
See supra note 128.




Judge Kozinski and the Ninth Circuit applied that test in New
Kids on the Block v. New America Publishing, Inc. to hold that
newspapers identifying the pop band as the subject of public opinion
polls did not infringe upon the intellectual property rights of the
band.152 Applying the same three-part test to ETFs shows that
secondary exchanges are not infringing on the index providers' marks.
First, exchange traded funds are not readily identifiable
without resort to the mark of the index. A Volkswagen or BMW
cannot readily be identified without using those marks. One could not
describe Spiders as an ETF that tracks the S&P 500 without using
that mark, or listing all 500 companies (or at least those that are in
the tracking portfolio). 153 It is nearly impossible, especially given the
rigid disclosure requirements,1 54 to offer, trade, or inform the investing
public about a particular ETF without using the mark of the index
provider whose index is the basis for that fund. The first element of
the defense is satisfied.
Second, secondary exchanges are justified in using the entire
mark, especially given the requirement that the secondary exchanges
provide a product information guide or prospectus. 55 Admittedly, it is
possible to refer to the "Standard & Poor's 500 Index" without using
that entire mark. Because the S&P 500 Index is the most prominent
market index composed of 500 companies, mere reference to "the 500"
may communicate the relevant information to one familiar with the
securities markets and financial matters. However, in the interest of
full disclosure to the investor, full use of the mark is reasonably
necessary to identify the index which is tracked by the particular ETF.
The second element is likewise satisfied.
Third, investors should not believe that the index provider has
authorized trading of the ETF on this particular exchange. Even
assuming that some investor confusion is possible, there is no reason
to think that such confusion would cause any harm to the index
provider. The First Circuit addressed a similar issue in WCVB-TV v.
Boston Athletic Association. 56  The appellee television station
broadcast a footrace and identified it as the "Boston Marathon"
without a licensing agreement from appellant Athletic Association.15
7
The court found that even if there were some confusion about the
152. Id. at 308-09.
153. See supra note 147. Listing the assets is not an easy task. That project occupies fifteen
pages of the Spiders Prospectus. Spiders Prospectus, supra note 1, at B-13 to B-27.
154. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
156. 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991).
157. Id. at 44.
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sponsorship of the event, it was harmless because there was no
evidence that the television station would profit from viewers wrongly
thinking that it had an agreement with the race organizers. 158
Relying in part on this finding that any possible confusion would be
inconsequential, the Court affirmed the denial of the Boston Athletic
Association's request for an injunction.159
On a certain level, the average investor is like the average
television viewer. Once the ordinary investor is sure that he is doing
nothing illegal, he probably does not care whether the Chicago Stock
Exchange has paid a licensing fee to Nasdaq for the ability to UTP the
QQQ. The average investor would care about the licensing agreement
only insofar as such a fee would be passed on to him. Intuitively, the
average investor would prefer that the secondary exchanges not pay
licensing fees if that meant tighter spreads and lower transaction
costs for him.
Additionally, the strict disclosure requirements imposed on
exchanges that trade ETFs make it unlikely that investors will
actually be confused as to the nature of relationships between the
exchanges and index providers. There is very little possibility of
confusion where secondary exchanges provide a prospectus or product
information brochure to investors. 160 For example, the NYSE has
stated that it is the general rule to provide information circulars to its
members when new investment products become available on the
exchange. 16' These information circulars contain a statement
regarding NYSE members' responsibility to "deliver a prospectus to
158. Id. at 46 ("Indeed, one would ordinarily believe that television viewers.., wish to see
the event and do not particularly care about the relation of station to event-promoter.").
159. Id. at 47.
160. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,298, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,614, 51,616 (Aug. 8,
2002) ('"The Commission believes that NYSE's proposal [to UTP the iShares MSCI Japan Index
Fund] should provide for adequate disclosure to investors relating to the terms, characteristics,
and risks of trading the Fund. All investors in the Fund, including those purchasing the Fund
on NYSE pursuant to UTP, will receive a prospectus or a Product Description regarding the
product." (citation omitted)). The SEC used the same language in connection with the NYSE's
proposal to UTP Vanguard's VIPERs, iShares Russell 2000 Index Funds, iShares Russell 2000
Value Index Funds, and iShares Russell 2000 Growth Index Funds. Exchange Act Release No.
34-46,306, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,916, 51,918 (Aug. 9, 2002); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-
46,299, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,907, 51,915 (Aug. 9, 2002) (granting Barclays an exemption enabling
dealers to trade Barclays ETF shares on a secondary market without delivering a prospectus.
Instead, "sales in the secondary market must be accompanied by a 'product description,'
describing the ETF and its shares"); 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,917 (representing that "As with all ETFs,
the [New York Stock] Exchange will distribute an information circular to its members in
connection with the trading of the ETFs"). Even NASD members trading equity ETFs through
ECNs must deliver product descriptions in connection with sales of ETF shares. 67 Fed. Reg. at
51,915 n.29 (citing NASD Rules 4420(i)(2) and 4420 (j)(2)).
161. 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,917.
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[all] investors purchasing shares of the ETFs ... ,"162 Before an
exchange may extend UTP, the exchange must satisfy the SEC
requirement that adequate measures have been taken to fully inform
the investing public, whether by prospectus, product description, or
information circular to exchange members. 163 The prospectus, product
description, or information circular should clearly explain on which
index the ETF is based, what entity actually created the ETF, and the
process used to track the index.1 64 To avoid any intellectual property
issues, the exchanges should inform the public that there is no
licensing agreement with the particular index provider. 16 5  The
possibility of confusion is minimal, and the risk of harm that could
result from that confusion is even smaller. The third element of the
New Kids on the Block test is satisfied. 166 The Lanham Act's fair use
defense, therefore, would be available to protect secondary exchanges
that extend unlicensed UTP to ETFs.
Index providers do not have a protectable interest that would
allow them to limit the markets that may engage in unlisted trading
of ETFs based on their indices. 167 Assuming that a trademark
infringement argument can be launched against the secondary
exchanges that extend unlicensed UTP, the secondary exchanges are
merely engaging in fair use by accurately describing another's
product. The Lanham Act's fair use defense protects the secondary
exchanges as long as they do not mislead the public or use more of the
index provider's mark than is reasonably necessary. Even if investors
did become confused, which is unlikely, such confusion would be
inconsequential.
Current regulation, which incorporates unlisted trading
privileges, does not permit index providers' current practice of
imposing licensing fees on secondary exchanges. Nor does the practice
gain a legal foothold with an intellectual property argument. The
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., id. ("The Commission believes that NYSE's proposal should provide for
adequate disclosure to investors .... (emphasis added)); Id. at 51,616 (including identical
language).
164. Such information is made clear in several prospectuses. E.g., Spiders Prospectus, supra
note 1, at A-2 to A-3; VIPERs Prospectus, supra note 2, at 1, 5; Diamonds Prospectus, supra note
7, at A-2 to A-3; QQQ Prospectus, supra note 2, at Al to A2.
165. Nasdaq has required the Philadelphia Stock Exchange to make precisely this disclosure,
in addition to certain disclaimers, in a licensing agreement allowing it to trade the QQQ on an
unlisted basis. Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,717, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,976, 80,979 (Dec. 22, 2000).
166. This conclusion assumes that prospectuses, information circulars, and product
description brochures actually are distributed in strict accordance with SEC regulations.
167. See supra Part IV.A.
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burden licensing fees place on the market is unsupportable under
current law.
V. ECONOMIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ETF LICENCING FEES ARE
UNSATISFACTORY
The argument against licensing fees is incomplete without a
consideration of economic policy. If licensing fees would be more
efficient or create more wealth than the current legal status quo, a
legal argument against licensing fees rings somewhat hollow.
Unlisted trading privileges were designed, at least in part, to foster
inter-market competition by eliminating the possibility of competition
for unique trading opportunities. 168  It therefore follows that no
discussion of licensing fees, which restrict a secondary exchange's
ability to extend unlisted trading privileges, is complete without
examining the competitive effects that the licensing fee might have.
This section examines the conventional wisdom regarding inter-
market competition, but notes that concerns about market
fragmentation may suggest an argument in favor of licensing fees. A
particular form of this argument, focusing on issuer control of trading
environment, is briefly described and then applied to index providers'
imposition of licensing fees. The following section responds to that
argument, ultimately concluding that the proposed issuer control
theory does not support licensing fees.
A. Inter-Market Competition May Not Be the Answer
The current regulatory regime is driven by inter-market
competition. The conventional wisdom is that inter-market
competition leads to more efficient markets, ultimately benefiting
investors. For example, the SEC generally makes certain findings
when it evaluates a proposal's effects on inter-market competition.
The Commission usually finds that the proposal to extend UTP to a
security "will provide investors with a convenient and less expensive
way of participating in the securities market."169 The SEC also often
finds that UTP "can produce added benefits to investors through the
168. H.R. REP. No. 103-626, at 5-6 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299, 3303-04.
169. Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,773, 66 Fed. Reg. 838, 842 (Jan. 4, 2001); Exchange Act
Release No. 34-45,718, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,965, 18,970 (Apr. 17, 2002); Exchange Act Release No. 34-
46,306, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,916, 51,918 (Aug. 9, 2002); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,306,
67 Fed. Reg. 51,907, 51,914 (Aug. 9, 2002) (substituting "fixed income markets" for "securities
markets" as appropriate for the ETF and omitting "and less expensive"); Exchange Act Release
No. 34-46,298, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,614, 51,615 (Aug. 8, 2002) (substituting "foreign securities" for
"securities" as appropriate for the ETF).
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increased competition between other markets trading the product."170
Congress believes that fostering inter-market competition benefits
investors. 171 The regional exchanges agree with the conventional
wisdom; the Boston Stock Exchange wrote in a proposal to the SEC
that "this increased competition among markets can benefit
investors."172
This conventional wisdom applies in specific instances as well
as in theory. The previously described battle between the NYSE and
the Amex over ETFs and transaction charges is perhaps the clearest
example of inter-market competition at work, driving efficiency and
lowering costs. 73 When Spiders and Diamonds began trading on
multiple markets, the additional volume helped to lower spreads, 174
which can measure the cost of trading. 75 It is commonly understood
that inter-market competition increases efficiency by lowering
transaction costs as the markets attempt to draw order volume to
their floors.
170. See e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,615; 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,918.
171. Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, 604 F.2d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Unlisted trading, therefore, is
an indispensable part of Congress' plan that securities markets compete with one another. At
present the smaller exchanges earn much revenue from unlisted trading. Exchanges like the
BSE must be able to trade securities on an unlisted basis to compete with the NYSE and, indeed,
to survive.").
172. Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,926, 66 Fed. Reg. 9731, 9734 (Feb. 9, 2001).
173. See supra notes 74-77 and related discussion.
174. NYSE To Trade 27 Additional Amex-listed ETFs, supra note 69 ("[T]he additional ETF
trading volume flowing through previous UTP arrangements has helped whittle away the spread
between bid and ask prices. For example, the spread between DIAMOND pricing dropped from
25 cents to 7 cents, and SPDRs fell from 15 cents to three cents .... ").
175. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the lowest amount a seller will accept for a
security and the highest amount a bidder will pay for the same security. For example, if a bidder
wants to buy a security at no more than $50, but no seller will sell for less than $51, the bid-ask
spread is $1. Broker-dealers use the spread to negotiate securities transactions in a market with
imperfect information. The bid-ask spread is a measure of liquidity because it amounts to a
transaction cost; the higher the broker-dealer's risk in temporarily holding a large amount of the
security, the higher the transaction costs, and the lower the liquidity of the security. One
analyst believes that "investors will benefit from the increased competition. Spreads will most
likely narrow." Kelly, supra note 64, at 1 (quoting Kevin McNally, an ETF analyst and vice
president at Salomon Smith Barney). Moreover, the SEC applied the conventional wisdom in
ruling on the Amex's proposal to allow side-by-side trading and integrated market making.
('Side-by-side trading' refers to the trading of securities and related derivative products at the
same location, though not necessarily by the same specialist... . 'Integrated market making'
refers to the trading of securities and related derivative products by the same specialist and/or
specialist firm." Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,213, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,232, 48,233 nn.9-10 (July
23, 2002)). The SEC found that "the potential improvements to liquidity and quality of the
markets in ETFs and TIRs and their related options by the Amex's proposal outweigh the
regulatory concerns [of misuse of material, non-public information]." Id. at 48,236. "TIR" is an
acronym for "Trust Issued Receipt," which for present purposes is a type of ETF.
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Despite its widespread acceptance, some argue that application
of policy that is based on conventional wisdom favoring inter-market
competition may have some negative effects. Some analysts believed
that investors would not actually benefit from the NYSE and the
Amex eliminating transaction fees for ETFs. As one analyst noted,
"The suspended fees will likely benefit the asset managers and the
brokers, but investors will still be charged commissions. The
downside for [investors] might be a reduction in liquidity ... 176
Multimarket trading of ETFs might fractionalize the market, reducing
liquidity. 177 Fragmenting the market can lower liquidity because
"[s]omeone might be raising the bid on one exchange while someone
else is lowering an ask on another exchange, and there's no guarantee
they'll ever find each other . . . . "178 Several brokers at the NYSE had
similar concerns when that exchange first extended unlisted trading
privileges to certain Amex ETFs. 179 While the conventional wisdom is
that inter-market competition drives efficiency, that very same
competition may cause fragmentation, thereby reducing liquidity and
depressing value.
B. The Amihud and Mendelson Argument for Issuer Determination of
Trading Circumstances
Seizing on the negative effects of market fragmentation,
Professors Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson argue that issuers of
securities ought to have the exclusive right to determine how and
where their securities are traded. °80 Amihud and Mendelson logically
start with the premise that issuers of securities have an incentive to
maximize the liquidity of the market for their security because that
will maximize value.' 8 ' Having the same security traded in multiple
markets has an indeterminate effect on the security's liquidity, and
consequently its value. 8 2  Amihud and Mendelson cite several
176. Brent, supra note 15, at 2.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Kouwe, supra note 66, at 7 (quoting an NYSE broker as saying, "'I think we will be
taking some volume away from the Amex, but ultimately we may be depleting the total volume
traded in these ETFs because there is no longer one central point of execution").
180. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1464 (1996).
181. Id. at 1428, 1431 ("Illiquidity costs affect securities values because investors require
compensation for bearing these costs. As a result securities with higher illiquidity costs will
have lower values .... [Securities issuers therefore] pursue policies directed at increasing the
liquidity of their publicly traded claims.").
182. Id. at 1433-41 (finding that "[bloth theory and empirical evidence thus show that multi-
market trading is beneficial in some cases and harmful in others").
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empirical studies demonstrating the indeterminate effects of
multimarket trading on a security's liquidity.183 In one study, prices
for NYSE and Amex listed stocks rose significantly, on average, on the
day a regional exchange announced an application for UTP; 53 percent
of stocks enjoyed a decline in bid-ask spreads, while 47 percent
experienced an increase. 184  In another study, the Boston Stock
Exchange and National Stock Exchange had experimental programs
where their brokers could compete for orders for NYSE stocks without
quoting narrower spreads; 67 percent of the stocks had a decline in
bid-ask spreads and 33 percent experienced an increase. 85 Because
multimarket trading benefits some issuers while harming a
substantial minority, Amihud and Mendelson propose that the issuer
be the sole determiner of where and how its securities are traded. 186
Those issuers who benefit from multiple market trading would be
permitted to engage in that practice, while those issuers who would be
harmed could consolidate all trading of their claims to a single market
of their choosing.'8 7
Amihud and Mendelson further argue that the current
regulatory regime is flawed because it takes a "one size fits all"
approach to market regulation when the evidence suggests that a
significant minority of issuers would fare better with different rules.
188
Moreover, the current multimarket regime encourages a race to the
bottom among markets as they attempt to attract traders by allowing
them to violate the rules of better-organized markets. 89 The authors
contend that the race to the bottom makes regulatory oversight by the
SEC necessary. 190 Both these problems could be solved, argue the
authors, if individual issuers were given the exclusive authority to
determine where and how their securities were traded.' 91 The end
results of the issuer-control scheme would be as follows: (1) there
would be no need for regulatory oversight by the SEC because issuers
183. One current statistic not available to the authors shows that the increased trading
volume due to unlisted trading of Diamonds and Spiders has resulted in lower spreads. NYSE to
Trade 27 Additional AMEX-listed ETFs, supra note 69, at 2 ("[T]he spread between DIAMOND
pricing dropped from 25 cents to 7 cents, and SPDRs fell from 15 cents to three cents").
184. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1439 (citing Walayet A. Khan & H. Kent
Baker, Unlisted Trading Privileges, Liquidity, and Stock Returns, 16 J. FIN. RES. 221 (1993)).
185. Id. at 1440 (citing Robert Battalio et al., Do Competing Specialists and Preferencing
Dealers Affect Market Quality? An Empirical Analysis (Nov 15, 1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Amihud & Mendelson)).
186. Id. at 1441-42.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1445.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1442.
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would force the markets to self-regulate; (2) securities values would be
maximized by issuers who could determine the most liquid market for
their securities; and (3) security holders as a group would benefit from
the increased liquidity of markets and corresponding increased value
of their securities. 192
Amihud and Mendelson's scheme would apply special rules to
derivative securities like ETFs. 193 This would be necessary because, in
cases where an issuer did not permit trading on a particular exchange,
the rule of exclusive issuer control could be circumvented by creating a
derivative security that mirrored the performance of that security but
was issued by a firm willing to allow trading on that exchange. 194
Amihud and Mendelson propose a "fair use" rule that would not
permit such an end-run if the derivative security's value is accurately
predictable from the value of the original security alone. 195 Such a
derivative security could not be traded without the underlying
security issuer's consent.196
The Amihud and Mendelson proposal seems to support index
providers and licensing fees. Some ETFs may benefit from trading in
multiple markets, but some may suffer decreased liquidity and value.
Those ETFs that are harmed by multimarket trading should be
permitted to consolidate trading in a single market. The licensing fee
is one mechanism that can be used to control the trading environment
of ETFs. If the QQQ's liquidity is increased by multiple market
trading, a licensing agreement would be granted to any exchange
desiring to trade the QQQ. If, however, Spiders' liquidity is decreased
by multiple market trading, the licensing agreement would be granted
to a single exchange, presumably the one with the "best" rules for
investors in Spiders. If licensing fees were indeed the logical result of
192. Id. at 1445-47.
193. The term "derivative" denotes a security whose value is determined either explicitly or
implicitly by the value of another security. The most obvious example is the stock option
contract, whose value depends on the value of the underlying stock.
194. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1455 (noting that the "most obvious
contingent claims are stock options"). Consider the following example: The issuer of security A
("Issuer") determines that A's liquidity and value are maximized through consolidation; thus, the
NYSE is the only market where security A may be traded. The Law Review Exchange, desirous
of the volume of security A, decides to create and issue security B. Security B is a derivative
whose value is exactly tied to security A's value. The Law Review Exchange, as the issuer of
security B, permits trading on the LRE. Despite the attempt to consolidate trading of security A
on the NYSE by Issuer, the LRE effectively has fragmented the market for security A by creating
and trading the functional equivalent of A- security B.
195. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1455.
196. Id. at 1461 ("The prices of security A can be used in any contract B without the consent
of A's issuer unless either (i) B is a traded derivative security with respect to A; or (ii) B is a
traded derivative security with respect to some security C that is itself a traded derivative
security with respect to A.").
[Vol. 57:3:11251160
BUCKING THE TREND
the Amihud and Mendelson proposal, there would be an economic
policy justification for imposition of such fees. Namely, there would be
an absolute increase in liquidity, and thus value, when ETFs currently
harmed by multimarket trading were permitted to consolidate. Such
an economic justification would weigh heavily in favor of licensing
fees, despite their lack of legal basis. The following section argues
that this economic policy justification, while appealing at first blush,
is ultimately chimerical.
C. Response to the Amihud and Mendelson Argument
Two main points render such an economic justification for
licensing fees unpersuasive. First, their proposal, as applied in the
ETF context, does not account for the different incentives of index
providers and issuers. Second, the Amihud and Mendelson proposal
does not accomplish its goal of eliminating the currently problematic
"one size fits all" regulatory approach. Moreover, while the problems
of a "one size fits all" approach at the issuer level motivate the
proposal, such an approach benefits investors as a group. These
problems strongly suggest that the Amihud and Mendelson proposal
cannot serve as an economic policy justification that would save
licensing fees from a lack of legal justification.
1. There Is a Relevant Distinction Between Issuers and Index
Providers
First, there is a relevant distinction between ETF issuers and
index providers. If the issuers of ETFs were charging licensing fees,
Amihud and Mendelson would presumably applaud. But issuers are
not currently imposing licensing fees on secondary exchanges for
ETFs. Rather, index providers are doing so. 197 Substituting "index
providers" for "issuers" in the Amihud and Mendelson proposal
ignores a critical difference in incentives between the two groups. The
central assumption of the issuer-control proposal is that issuers have
an incentive to increase liquidity because liquidity benefits investors
as a group and makes raising equity capital in the future easier. 198
The index provider does not have the same incentives as the issuer of
the ETF to maximize liquidity.
The index provider has no reason to increase the liquidity of an
ETF that uses its index because the index's value is entirely
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1416 ("The issuer, therefore, has the incentive
to select the trading regime that will maximize the value of its securities.").
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independent of the ETF. Increasing the liquidity of the ETF has no
impact on the index provider, except insofar as the provider collects
licensing fees on a per transaction basis. In that case, the index
provider does have the incentive to increase liquidity of the ETF to
maximize its licensing fee. This argument for licensing fees, though,
presumes the conclusion that index providers could already charge
licensing fees.199  Moreover, the issuer of the ETF already has an
incentive to increase the ETF's liquidity and can be expected to act
rationally on that incentive. 200 The index providers' licensing fees
would be a duplicative method of creating the same incentive for a
different party. Any liquidity benefits will already be achieved by the
issuer. Giving index providers the same control will not result in
additional liquidity benefits. If a licensing fee is charged, exchanges
will pass the fee through to the specialists or market makers. 201 The
specialists or market makers will then recoup that charge from the
investing public. Thus, the investing public will pay greater
transaction costs without receiving the benefits of additional liquidity.
To highlight the difference between index providers and
issuers, consider the following: The Law Review 50 is an index of the
fifty largest firms listed on the Law Review Exchange. It is created
and maintained by Vandy Group, Inc. Vandy Group licensed the Law
Review 50 index to Issuer for use in Issuer's new ETF. Issuer has
determined that multimarket trading of the new ETF will maximize
liquidity; Issuer therefore permits trading on the Amex, the NYSE,
and the LRE. However, Vandy Group disapproves of the LRE, and
refuses to grant the LRE a license. What happens when an issuer
wants multimarket trading, but the index provider refuses to license
some, or all, exchanges? The converse is equally problematic: Vandy
Group believes multiple market trading is a valuable advertising
opportunity, and so grants licenses to the Amex, NYSE, and the LRE.
Issuer wants to consolidate trading on the Amex. Allowing both issuer
and index provider to control trading circumstances could lead to a
stalemate. It is at best unclear how these conflicts should be resolved.
It is clear, however, that application of the Amihud and Mendelson
proposal to ETFs is problematic.
199. Index providers can charge licensing fees to the issuing trust of the ETF, and these fees
may be on a per transaction basis. Thus, the index provider would have an incentive to
maximize liquidity of the ETF. The argument that such an incentive is duplicative, however,
still applies. No additional liquidity benefits will flow to investors as a result of the index
providers' incentives. There also is no guarantee that issuers and index providers will agree on
what trading circumstances will maximize liquidity.
200. Id. at 1415 ("[T]he issuer has the clearest incentive to choose the most efficient trading
regime for its securities."); see also notes 181-187 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Because ETFs are strong derivatives of a particular index,
Amihud and Mendelson's analysis of derivatives might support
another argument in favor of licensing fees.202 The authors conclude
that for "traded derivative securities," the issuer of the underlying
security must grant permission before the derivative can be traded.20 3
It would seem to follow that, if ETFs are derivatives of indices, the
index provider should have the relevant stake in the ETF to assert
control over its trading environment in the form of a licensing fee.
Assuming ETFs meet Amihud and Mendelson's test for traded
derivative securities, the rationale for allowing the index provider to
control the trading regime still fails because the index provider is not
an issuer of a security. The motivation behind Amihud and
Mendelson's traded derivative security rule is that some issuers may
be harmed by the fragmentation caused by competition between a
security and its derivative. 20 4 If a substantially similar product (the
derivative) is available in another market, the problems of market
fragmentation arise despite the underlying security issuer's desire to
consolidate trading in a single market with issuer-favorable rules. 205
However, no matter how perfectly an ETF tracks an index, there will
be no competition between the two because the former is a security
and the latter is a collection of information designed to be a market
barometer. 20 6 The rationale supporting the application of issuer-
control theory to derivatives fails in the case of index providers and
ETFs because there is no competition between the two.
It might be argued that an index provider, because its mark is
being used on the ETF, has an incentive to increase liquidity to
enhance its own good name and reputation in the financial world.
One may also speculate that trading ETFs in multiple markets might
reduce the value of the ETF, thus negatively impacting the reputation
of the underlying index. For example, if Diamonds are traded in
multiple markets despite Dow Jones' wishes, Diamonds may suffer a
202. See supra notes 1-3.
203. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1457-58 ("[O]ur rule will require the issuer's
consent before a market may allow public trading in contingent claims, such as listed options,
that can serve as substitutes for the underlying traded security.").
204. Id. at 1456; see also Part V.B.
205. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1455-56.
206. It bears mentioning that the Amihud and Mendelson threshold for being a traded
derivative security permits the creation of market indices without the underlying security
issuer's consent. Id. at 1464 (fixing the traded derivative security threshold to "allow the creation
of broad market indices without requiring the consent of the issuers of component individual
securities."). It is highly unlikely that a single underlying security would be so predictive of an
index that the issuer should be able to control the trading environment of the ETF based on it.
Id. Thus, an ETF could be a traded derivative security of and be in competition with only an
index, but not a particular security contained within an index.
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negative price impact from illiquidity that could reflect poorly on Dow
Jones as an index provider. The following section maintains that even
if index providers could establish that they were negatively impacted
by ETF illiquidity, other problems with the Amihud and Mendelson
proposal would still suggest that it does not supply the needed
economic justification to support licensing fees.
2. The "Might Makes Right" Approach Does Not Solve the Problem of
"One Size Fits All" Regulation
One substantive concern with the Amihud and Mendelson
proposal is that it substitutes a "might makes right" approach for the
current "one size fits all" approach. 20 7 This substitution does not
ultimately solve the problem of "one size fits all" regulation.
Exchanges will compete with each other for exclusive issuer
permission to trade the most popular and profitable securities. 208
There are certain securities issuers (big issuers) that are so popular
that it is unlikely an exchange could survive without having any of
them permit trading on that exchange. The members of the Major
Market Index may be such issuers. 209 Regional stock exchanges such
as Cincinnati (now National Stock Exchange), Philadelphia, Boston,
and Chicago would suffer most if the NYSE or the Amex obtained
exclusive trading agreements with such popular issuers. In 1992, for
example, over 97 percent of the trading volume on the regional
exchanges was in unlisted NYSE and Amex stocks. 210 Without
unlisted trading privileges, it is doubtful that the regional exchanges
would be able to survive.
207. The term "might makes right" is used to describe the situation that follows in the text,
where some securities issuers are so powerful that they can demand that the exchanges adopt
favorable rules before allowing trading of their claims.
208. If the issuer benefited from multiple market trading, it is unlikely that it would enter
into an exclusive trading agreement with any exchange. One can assume, however, that at least
some big issuers will consolidate trading. Those big issuers who are indifferent to multimarket
versus consolidated trading may be "talked into" exclusive agreements by the exchanges desiring
to gain a competitive advantage. The Note is concerned, at this point, with big issuers who
would not refuse a profitable exclusive trading agreement, if available.
209. The Major Market Index is an index of twenty large companies computed by the Amex.
American Stock Exchange, Other Products, Product Information, List All Indexes, Amex Major
Market Index, at http://www.amex.com (last visited March 2, 2004). The most heavily weighted
stocks in the index are (in descending order): Procter & Gamble, IBM, Chevrontexaco Corp., 3M
Co., Altria Group, Johnson & Johnson, and American Express. American Stock Exchange, Other
Products, Product Information, List All Indexes, Amex Major Market Index, Show Index
Components, at http://www.amex.com (last visited March 2, 2004).
210. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1417 (citing DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC,
MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (1994)).
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To secure the big issuers necessary to survival, the exchanges
in the Amihud and Mendelson scheme would adopt trading rules and
machinery that most favored the big issuers. If not, the big issuers
would be powerful enough to demand rule changes before permitting
trading on an exchange. 211 When the interests of two issuers diverge,
the exchanges would adopt the rule benefiting the one with the larger
profit potential. Adopting rules and procedures to benefit the greatest
number of big issuers may not benefit a numerically large group of
medium- or smaller-sized issuers. Issuers whose interests differ from
those of the big issuers would be shut out of the courtship, and would
have to live with the rules dictated by the big issuers. However, it is a
basic premise of Amihud and Mendelson's argument that one size does
not fit all.212 Allowing the big issuers to "capture" the exchanges
would bring back the status quo the authors criticize: several issuers
would be satisfied with the rules, and several would not. This
situation troubles Amihud and Mendelson, but their proposal does not
avoid it.
Amihud and Mendelson attempt to respond to this argument
by suggesting that an exchange could adopt different rules for
different issuers.21 3 That suggestion is inconceivable in a functional
legal system. If different issuers have different rules on their own
suggestion, there are in reality no rules at all. Suppose one issuer
wants a rule requiring immediate disclosure of block trades. The
exchange adopts it for this issuer, but other issuers need not require
disclosure if they would rather not; they have their own, different
rules. How is the individual investor to know what he must
disclose? 21 4 Worse, suppose that the first issuer changes its mind, and
211. As an example of demanded rule changes, ETF Advisors Trust et al., in applying for
certain exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940, wrote: "Applicants state that any
other Exchange that applies for unlisted trading privileges in FITRs [the proposed Fund] will
have to adopt similar rules [pertaining to Product Descriptions]." ETF Advisors Trust et al.,
Exchange Act Release No. IC-25,725, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,464, 57,465 (Sept. 10, 2002) (emphasis
added). Although this statement merely is a practical application of 17 C.F.R. § 240.12f-5, which
requires any UTP exchange to have listing standards comparable to the primary or listing
market, the statement is a perfect example of the demands big issuers might make, and to which
regional exchanges would have no option but acquiesce.
212. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1441 ("One size fits all' regulation is clearly
undesirable.").
213. Id. at 1451 ("[A] market may choose to implement different rules for different securities
based on their issuers' preferences"). To implement this system, exchanges might have "a menu
of . . rules offered to different securities on the same exchange." Id. at 1452.
214. The situation becomes substantially more complicated as the rule becomes more
complicated. For example, there are more possible regulations than disclosure and non-
disclosure. Some issuers may permit delayed disclosure with a period of delay ranging from
seconds to days. It is difficult for the investor to know what to disclose, and even more difficult
to know when he must disclose it.
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does not wish for its security holders to have to disclose block trades
anymore. There seems to be nothing to keep the rule from changing.
This lack of predictability and uniformity would undoubtedly make
investors wary and have a chilling effect on investment until uniform,
predictable rules were adopted.
There is a second substantive problem with the Amihud and
Mendelson proposal: their rejection of the "one size fits all" regulatory
approach shifts the constraint of uniformity from issuers to the
individual investor. Rather than "one size fits all" at the national
level, Amihud and Mendelson propose a "one size fits all" scheme at
the security-holder level. As they state, "management's decision on
the trading regime should serve the interests of the current security
holders as a group."215 In effect, a smaller, more fragmented "one size
fits all" approach has been substituted for a national "one size fits all."
There are two problems with this tactic.
First, the issuer of a security has no interest in the security
when it is in the hands of individual holders,216 so there appears to be
no legal basis for allowing the issuer to determine what a particular
security holder may do with his shares. Second, it is not necessarily
the case that all holders of a particular security will want to, or
should, follow the same rules. Consider the following: Procter &
Gamble (P & G) has decided that liquidity of its shares is maximized
in a market that enforces immediate disclosure of block trades. The
Law Review Exchange allows delayed disclosure of block trades.
Smith, an individual investor, wants to trade a large block of P & G
stock without immediately disclosing that he is doing so. His natural
outlet is the Law Review Exchange, but P & G has determined that
Smith may not trade his P & G stock on the LRE. Other P & G
shareholders do not want to trade without the disclosure
requirements, or are indifferent. Rather than all issuers being treated
the same under a "one size fits all" approach, Smith and all the other
P & G shareholders are treated identically under a "one size fits all"
approach. 217
There is no principled reason for the distinction between
security holders and issuers with regards to a "one size fits all"
approach. That approach should either be acceptable for both groups,
or unacceptable for either. Amihud and Mendelson claim that issuers
215. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1442 (emphasis added).
216. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
217. The problem is evident over time, as well. If immediate disclosure benefits security
holders as a group today, there is no guarantee that it will continue to benefit a different group
of security holders in ten or twenty years. Yet future security holders are treated the same as
present security holders, despite potentially conflicting interests.
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will choose the trading regime that is best for their security holders as
a group.218 Ironically, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the
current regulatory regime benefits issuers as a group.219 The minority
of issuers who desired a different trading regime motivated Amihud
and Mendelson to devise a system whereby the minority of issuers
could design their own rules. 220 However, the minority of security
holders who do not agree with the issuer's determination of trading
regime are simply out of luck.221 There appears to be no reason for
benefiting issuers on an individual basis while simultaneously
benefiting security holders as a group.222
Amihud and Mendelson proposed that issuer control of trading
regime may increase liquidity and value of the security. 223 Their
proposal seems to support index providers that charge licensing fees.
On closer scrutiny, though, index providers cannot be substituted for
issuers in the theory. Moreover, substantive concerns with the
proposal indicate that it does not provide the hoped-for support for
licensing fees. It therefore appears that there is no economic policy
basis for licensing fees that would justify the current practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Index providers currently impose licensing fees on secondary
exchanges that trade exchange traded funds based on the providers'
indices.224 Exchanges appear for the most part to acquiesce in this
218. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1442.
219. 53 percent of stocks in one study and 67 percent in another, enjoyed decreased spreads
under the current multimarket trading regime. See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
220. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1439-40 (referring to the 47 percent and 33
percent minorities as "a sizable proportion" and "a significant proportion," respectively).
221. One may argue that Smith should not be permitted to trade as he desires because he
does not mpximize the liquidity and value of his securities. First, there is still no legal basis for
P&G telling Smith where he may and where he may not trade his securities, regardless of his
rationality. See, e.g., Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1987).
Second, there is little reason to suspect that P&G is familiar enough with Smith's circumstances
to know that his trade will in fact decrease liquidity. Short of arguing that Smith cannot exist or
should be ignored, the problem of applying a general rule to specific individuals in various
circumstances remains.
222. Amihud and Mendelson respond that individual traders have an incentive to deviate
from the issuer's plan to increase liquidity. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 183, at 1464-65.
Issuers' interests, however, will always be to maximize liquidity, resulting in maximized "overall
wealth by reducing the cost of capital in the economy at large." Id. at 1465. While this may be
true, one can hypothesize that allowing Smith, and only Smith, to execute this particular trade
on the LRE would increase liquidity, and thus be in P&G's interests. The problems of "one size
fits all" are not avoided when issuers can control trading regime only by general rule.
223. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1464-66.
224. See supra Part III.A.
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practice, paying the licensing fees because of the huge profit potential
in the ETF market. One reason for their acquiescence is that the
exchanges then pass those fees on to specialists or market makers.
Allowing index providers the opportunity to limit the
exchanges permitted to trade ETFs is contrary to congressional policy,
as demonstrated by the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994.225
First, licensing fees reintroduce de facto procedural formalities that
Congress sought to eliminate in passing the UTP Act of 1994. Second,
licensing fees reduce inter-market efficiency competition by
introducing the possibility of substantive competition.
While a trademark-based argument seems an attractive
justification for imposing licensing fees on secondary exchanges, it
ultimately does not withstand scrutiny. First, index providers do not
have a protectable interest that would allow them to control ETFs that
are traded on secondary exchanges.226 Much like a car manufacturer
does not have a protectable interest in the resale of one of its cars,
index providers do not have a protectable interest in the resale of
ETFs in the marketplace. 227 To the extent that index providers could
establish a protectable interest in their marks as used by secondary
exchanges trading ETFs, the fair use defense to infringement protects
the secondary exchanges. 228 Legal justification for secondary exchange
licensing fees is lacking.
Because market fragmentation may reduce liquidity, it is
possible that the current policy of promoting inter-market competition
is not the most economically efficient. Seizing on that possibility,
Professors Amihud and Mendelson argue for the economic benefits of
issuer control of trading regime.229 Because issuers have the best
incentive to increase liquidity and value, the professors argue that the
issuers should be permitted to determine, perhaps through licensing
fees, which exchanges may trade their securities. 230 With regard to
ETFs, it was initially hoped that the reasons issuers could be relied
upon to demand rules increasing liquidity would also apply to index
providers, thus providing an economic justification for licensing fees.
However, it is not at all clear that index providers do, in fact, have the
same incentives as securities issuers. Assuming that they do, index
providers' incentives would be merely duplicative of the issuers' and
225. See generally Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)
(2000)); H.R. REP. No. 103-626 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3299.
226. See supra Part IV.A.
227. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
229. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1464-66.
230. Id. at 1415.
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would depend entirely on the provider being able to charge licensing
fees.
Apart from the distinction between issuers and index
providers, there are substantive concerns with Amihud and
Mendelson's proposal. First, the authors argue that "one size fits all"
is not a valid regulatory approach.231 They would substitute a "might
makes right" approach whereby the most powerful issuers could
demand rules favorable to themselves. 232  Rather than the SEC
dictating general rules to all issuers, the big issuers could dictate
general rules to all the other issuers. The problems of "one size fits
all" regulation are therefore not avoided despite individual
determination of trading regime. Second, Amihud and Mendelson find
the "one size fits all" approach at the issuer level problematic, but
suggest rules that benefit security holders as a group, thereby creating
a "one size fits all" approach at the investor level. 233 Ironically, issuers
benefit as a group from inter-market competition. 234 There is no
principled reason that benefiting investors as a group under the
current regulatory regime is unacceptable, but benefiting security
holders as a group is permissible under the proposed scheme.
There is no legal or economic justification for the current
practice of index providers imposing licensing fees on secondary
exchanges for the unlisted trading of ETFs. Index providers have no
special status, legal or economic, that permits them to charge such
licensing fees. The fees constitute a burden on the market that should
not be borne ultimately by the investing public absent some
reasonable justification.235
Inter-market efficiency competition can drive the elimination of
the very licensing fees that may inhibit it. The pass-through of fees to
specialists seems to negate the exchanges' incentives to challenge
licensing fees. However, the first secondary exchange to successfully
challenge licensing fees on ETFs will gain a competitive advantage
because its overall trading experience will be cheaper. The logic of
market competition suggests that the other exchanges will follow suit
and licensing fees will ultimately disappear. A successful challenge
231. Id. at 1441.
232. See supra Part V.C.2.
233. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1441.
234. See supra note 219 and related discussion.
235. One may suggest that the burden of licensing fees either will not "trickle down" to the
investing public, or it will be so dissipated as to be negligible. This result is possible, though not
likely in a system of inter-market competition. Regardless who directly benefits from the
elimination of licensing fees, however, the cheaper transaction costs would be an economic
improvement in absolute terms. The current practice, at best, does not hold forth the same
promise of economic improvement.
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will directly benefit investors by reducing their transaction costs, and
creating a more efficient, liquid market for the already tremendously
popular exchange traded funds.
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